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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet regulation, like the Internet itself, captures the cross currents
of the government's decisive intervention and studied indifference. The
Internet's early growth was financed with Department of Defense dollars.
But before its explosive growth in the late 1990s, Washington cut its purse
strings and apron strings from its innovative creation. Congress paid
Delphic attention to the Internet in its 1996 rewrite of the nation's
communications laws. Most of the Internet focus in that protracted
legislation was keeping regulation from harming the growth of broadband,
not authorizing regulators to fix what ailed it.
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FCC Internet regulation really began in 2005 with the Madison River
case.1 If hard cases make bad law, easy cases provide scant law. Such was
the case when the FCC pounced on a decision by Madison River
Communications, a yet-to-be-deregulated telephone broadband provider,
which blocked a competing Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP) provider
2
because of the competitor's impact on its legacy wireline phone business.
But, for the most part, the FCC stayed away from substantive Internet
regulation until its recent efforts to define unacceptable network
management by a cable broadband provider, Comcast, and its network
neutrality rulemaking.3 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been
cautious on broad rules as well.4
The Internet is only going to become more central to the business and
pastimes of Americans, and the call for different types of regulation is
ongoing, inevitable, and often justified, given the range of Internet protocol
(IP), consumer protection, child safety, and anti-deception interests the
Web involves. But behind these calls-to expand broadband availability
and adoption, and to regulate broadband network providers, in particularis the assumption that regulation will work well enough to outweigh its
costs. Calls for "network neutrality" or "nondiscrimination" assume with
little hesitation federal agency competence to give predictable and accurate
meaning to these terms and create regulations to implement them.
Advocates presuppose that, without the threat and reality of regulation to
assure network neutrality, Internet consumer welfare will be substantially
reduced. With sufficient expertise, careful fact gathering, and the

1. Madison River Comm., LLC, Order,20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
2. Id. Verizon's short-lived decision to deny NARAL Pro-Choice America use of its
text-messaging service because of the controversy over abortion is cited as another example
of how a network can interfere with Internet communications. See Adam Lepta, Verizon
Blocks Messages of Abortion Rights Group, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/us/27verizon.html. Verizon Wireless's decision on
whom to sell noncommon carrier service like its short-code service differs from the decision
to block use of its network transmission service, as was the case in Madison River. Still,
Verizon's explicit discrimination based on content, although quickly reversed, highlighted
the power of the network provider in the content arena. See Susan Crawford Blog,
http://scrawford.blogware.com (Sept. 28,2007, 12:47 EDT).
3. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 3. The FCC launched a network
neutrality rulemaking in 2009. Preserving The Open Internet, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 2009 WL 3413028, (F.C.C.), October 22, 2009 available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93AI.pdf. This Article was
written prior to any decision in that proceeding.
4. FTC STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND COMPETITION CONNECTIVITY POLICY 9 (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf ("In evaluating whether new
proscriptions are necessary, we advise proceeding with caution before enacting broad, ex
ante restrictions in an unsettled, dynamic environment.").
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protections of appellate review for arbitrary or unsupported outcomes, the
system of regulation can and should be expected to work. Can it?
Add to this assumption the natural regulatory appetite of those who
get selected to serve on a regulatory agency like the FCC. FCC
commissioners are called in to settle disputes among competitors and
competing industries in furtherance of the public interest; to desire the job
is to seek an opportunity to regulate, often actively. At the same time,
deregulation in the face of sufficient competition is as much of an FCC
mantra as regulating in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." 5
But until a market is adequately competitive, a regulator regulates. As to
the Internet, should the he or she?
This Article's chief contribution to the Internet policy debate is to
focus attention on the likelihood of successful FCC Internet regulation-a
key assumption of some advocates 6 -and to measure the odds of success
based on the agency's past performance over managing networks. Based on
the analysis here, that likelihood is that the FCC will be unsuccessful in
trying to manage networks directly.
Those who advocate FCC involvement should recognize that
resolution by administrative agency, as a first resort to solving oftenlegitimate questions about network behavior, is likely to produce worse
public policies than nongovernmental forums. Ex ante network neutrality
regulation of Internet network providers-like cable, wireline telephone,
and wireless companies-poses risks for the continued development of the
Internet that some network neutrality advocates minimize unrealistically.
Indeed, the ever-increasing literature on enforcing network neutralitystarting with the end-to-end advocates of a "dumb pipe" in the middle 7 and

5. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
6. See Letter from Lawrence Lessig, Dir., Ctr. For Internet and Soc'y, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Sec'y FCC, (undated), availableat http://lessig.org/blog/2FCC.pdf (referring to the
FCC's 3-2 decision to regulate network management actively in light of a complaint against
Comcast for throttling traffic using BitTorrent: "In all of my experience reviewing
govemment decisions affecting the Internet, I have read none that are more subtle and
sophisticated in their understanding of the Internet, and few that are as important for setting
the conditions under which innovation and competition on the Internet will flourish."). The
Comcast case is discussed in Sec. IV. infra.
7. See, e.g., YOcHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
THE FuTuRE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34-35 (2001);
Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. Comm.L.J. 561 (2000); Susan P.
Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359,
392 (2007) ("[O]nline diversity stems from allowing the end-to-end, content-neutral, layerindependent functions of the Internet to flourish .... ); Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig,
The End of End-to-End: Preservingthe Architecture of the Internet in the BroadbandEra,
48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 970 (2001); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network
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continuing with critics of network management policies-assume
regulators can get "nondiscrimination" rules just right.8
Importantly, this Article does not abjure regulation because there is
likely to be a sufficiently competitive market for broadband network
services nationwide in the near term. It therefore departs from antiregulation advocates who base their case against government network
management on the existence of sufficient consumer choice among
facilities-based wireline and wireless networks.9 Were that the case, the
competitive model, and its consequences, would apply: if a provider's
network management rules are unsatisfactory, vote with your feet and
switch providers.
The conclusion rests, instead, on an analysis of three characteristics
that hobble the FCC, the likeliest federal agency to provide prescriptive
rules. First, the record for the agency, on a host of industry decisions where
technology plays a pivotal role, tilts decidedly against counting on
successful execution of regulation. Second, the technology here is unlike
anything the FCC has successfully regulated before. The technical
competence of the agency on some matters is that of a specialist and well
worth the deference paid by appellate courts in affirming countless
technical judgments. Judging networks, which are constructed and operated
for maximum private gain and are not based on a government-approved
rate of return model, isn't among them.
Finally, the agency itself has yet to demonstrate that it is the best
locus of power for deciding the fate of the Internet. The political economy
Layers Model, 56 FED. CoMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Tim Wu, The BroadbandDebate, A User's
Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004).

8. This "Do something!" rhetoric recalls the joke about the three academics who find
themselves in a twelve-foot hole and have to figure a way out. The engineer and the
philosopher each contribute their answer. When it comes to the economist, the answer is
clear: "Assume a ladder." For critics of broadband network providers the ladder is
surefooted federal regulation. However, if the agency's past is an indication, its incantation
will not produce successful rules for broadband network providers.
9. See, e.g., Written Testimony of Christopher S. Yoo, Professor of Law and
Communications, Co-Dir., Ctr. for Tech., Innovation, and Competition, before the FCC,
Cambridge
Mass.,
34-35
(Feb.
25,
2008),
http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_
network management/022508/yoo.pdf:
At times, some new development may arise to which the market may need some
time to adjust. For example, when they first arose, network owners prohibited the
use of [Virtual Private Networks] and home networking devices. This would
ultimately prove short lived. Consumer pressure induced the network owners to
change course. Although some have pointed to this development as demonstrating
the need to impose network neutrality regulation, I think it demonstrates the
opposite. It shows how consumers [sic] preferences exercised through the
competitive process can force openness in the ways that render regulation
unnecessary.
Id. See also Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27-28

(2005).
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of the FCC makes it less successful as an expert agency. There are other,
better ways to resolve disputes besides the FCC's processes and the
inevitable appellate review.
What would work better? This Article agrees with those who argue
that the nation's traditional antitrust statutes, network self-regulation, and
the use of long-standing Internet working groups are better ways to resolve
network-management disputes than relying on FCC enforcement. These
three approaches are briefly reviewed here. This Article adds two
interrelated approaches to the set of non-FCC solutions: (1) reliance on the
shame/wiki/blog culture of the Internet and (2) disclosure of management
practices by network providers, enforceable under contract. These
approaches are congenial with the most basic Internet values of information
transparency and sharing.
Network neutrality is an evolving area with few verities. Broadband
network conduct may be so offensive (think Madison River) and Congress'
directive may become so clear1 ° that regulatory rules of the road may
become inevitable. But, given what we know of the FCC's successes and
failures, that should be a last resort. Participants in the network neutrality
debate ignore this history at their peril.

II. Is BROADBAND SUFFICIENTLY COMPETITIVE TO LEAVE
NETWORK MANAGEMENT TO MARKET FORCES?
A.

The FCC and Communications Markets

The FCC has changed its regulatory attention many times over its
seventy-five years. The agency's activism from the 1930s through the
1960s mostly involved broadcasters, not communications networks,
though. At its inception, the FCC played only a minor role in actually
regulating networks like telephone and telegraph. These were monopoly
services in most areas by 1934 and remained so, substantially, until the
1970s.' The FCC's objective was to hold the Bell Telephone Company
and Western Union to their promise to provide affordable, widely available
services. 12 Until competition came along from competitive long-distance
providers and then others in the late 1960s, network infrastructure review
was something of a backwater, eclipsed by the more colorful, better

10. See, e.g., Internet Freedom Preservation Act, H.R. 3458, 111th Cong. (2009)
(providing broad FCC authority and direction).
11. DANIEL L. BRENNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMON CARRIERS IN THE
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, Ch. 10 (1996).
12. See generally, JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE (1975).
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3
understood, often litigious radio and television-station businesses.1
Competition finally spread to telephone service by the 1970s. Promoting
competition seemed to consume the FCC's attention in trying to implement
the 1996 Telecommunications Act for the ten years after enactment.14
At the time the FCC was created (as a "modem" version of the
Federal Radio Commission) in 1934, radio stations had been subject to
licensing for less than a decade. 5 Prior to the 1927 Radio Act, radio
stations had no protection against interference.' 6 And, while it might have
been possible to develop a market approach to insure interference
protection, the choice was made to license stations in the "public interest,
convenience, or necessity."' 7 The government must, by statute if not in
practice, find affirmatively that renewal of a broadcast station's license is
in the public interest. And, as for the other major communications sector,
telephony, the model was a regulated monopoly service, largely provided
by AT&T and smaller independent phone companies, which were also
monopolies.
Drafters of the 1934 Act thus observed a communications landscape
of limited competition: protected frequency exclusivity for radio licensees
(with little appreciation for Coase-like considerations about resource
allocation) and protected exclusivity for monopoly phone providers. Given
these facts on the ground, framers spent no time on the possibility that
regulation might be unnecessary under competitive conditions.'" With the
experience of competition, today we see that regulation is appropriate only
insofar as competition fails to provide alternatives to an incumbent's
offering. As with most goods and services in society, price or entry
regulation is not necessary when sufficient market competition exists.
Customers can choose a competitive provider if dissatisfied with the
current one.

13. Because there were nearly all monopoly telecommunications providers, questions
of entry policy did not arise. And the appetite for rate-of-return review by politically
appointed FCC commissioners was understandably limited.
14. See Sec. IV.B.2 infra.
15. Congress first licensed radio in the 1927 Radio Act. The Act did not include
provisions for common carriers. They were added with the 1934 Communications Act.
Telephone (and telegraph) providers were deemed to be common carriers in the 1910 MannElkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, Sec. 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910). The definition and duties
of telephone common carriers relied on unmodified definitions taken from the 1887
Interstate Commerce Act, which had codified duties of railroad common carriers. Interstate
Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), codified and amended 49 U.S.C. passim.
16. See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926), reprinted in FRANK J. KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 27 (1972).

17. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
18. Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent-Seeking and the First Amendment, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1997).
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Modem communications theory-developed through the 1970s and
1980s by the FCC through the application of economic thinking from
Coase,' 9 Kahn, 20 and others, 2' and embedded limitedly in Section 10 of the
1996 Act-says this: market, not government, regulation of
communications services should be the default.22 Government regulation of
the prices, terms, or conditions of an offering is unnecessary when
consumers have meaningful choices of service providers. Only where the
market fails to produce those choices (i.e., "market failure") should we
invoke regulation.
As a coda to this formulation, it should be added that the government
regulation also should produce no worse result than the conditions of
market failure. Put another way, regulation should still be avoided if the
regulator cannot meaningfully improve the customer's experience, even in
a market where competition is insufficiently present. Regulation in the
absence of competition is inadvisable if the regulation does more harm than
a noncompetitive market, left alone, produces.
But this way of thinking, to a New Deal regulator in 1934 (let alone to
some regulatory advocates today), would seem to be crazy talk. With a
Depression underway, and the screech of fascism broadcast on German
radio frequencies, it is little wonder that the 1934 Act did not focus on the
benefits of a competitive marketplace or the need for regulatory humility in
supervising the airwaves.2 3 As for competition in phone or telegraph
service? It was all the FCC could do to prevent AT&T from dominating the
radio business as it was doing as a "natural monopoly" for telephone
customers.2 4

19. See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1959).
20. See Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions
(1988); Alfred Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing,1 YALE J. ON REG.
139(1984).
21. Among the FCC's most persistent critics and market enthusiasts is Thomas Hazlett.
See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase 's "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001). For my own early
contribution, see Mark Fowler & Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982).
22. Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 160 (2006)). The FCC had already been granted authority to forbear from
regulating cellular telephone providers as common carriers. Id. at § 332(c)(1).
23. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (finding that the public-interest
standard for regulating broadcasting "isas concrete as the complicated factors for judgment
in such a field of delegated authority permit") (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 138 (1940)).
24. In 1925, AT&T decided WEAF and its embryonic network were incompatible with
AT&T's primary goal of providing a telephone service. AT&T offered to sell the station to
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Thus, the preamble-like Section 151 of the Act declares that the FCC
was created "[fjor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States ... a rapid, efficient,
nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges., 25 This provision is a mandate to
regulate. It is not a mandate to forbear from regulating in the presence of
sufficient competition. And it is this general authority (and the definitions
that follow), this so-called Title I authority, which forms the basis for the
FCC's authority over new services like broadband Internet providers.2 6
B. The BroadbandNetwork Market Is Less Than Fully Competitive
Nationwide
As noted, by 1996, Congress in Section 10 of the Act recognized what
the FCC earlier determined: at least insofar as telecommunications services
were concerned, the agency could forbear from regulating in the presence
of sufficient competition. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering cable
modem service, 27 DSL, 28 or wireless 29 are not telecommunications services
but information services. So, while it does not appear that Section 10's
forbearance literally applies to such services, as a matter of competitive
policy, its philosophy should--provided of course that competition is
sufficiently present.
Were that the case, the debate over federal regulation of the network
layer would be reduced to a question of whether there was sufficient
competition among broadband networks. With sufficient competition, a
customer would choose a provider whose network management practices
best fit the customer's needs.3 °
RCA in a deal that included the right to lease AT&T's telephone lines for network
transmission. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NBC.
25. Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
26. See Comcast Complaint, supra note 3, at para. 15. ("Yet as muddy as the legal
waters may seem to Comcast, we think our ancillary authority [under Title I] to enforce
federal policy is quite clear.").
27. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
DeclaratoryRuling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002), aff'd,
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005).
28. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853,
14,862 (2005), affd sub nom. Time Warner Telecomm., Inc. v. FCC 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2007).
29. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, DeclaratoryRuling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (2002).
30. As then-presidential candidate Barack Obama put it, "[i]f there were four or more
competitive providers of broadband service to every home, then cable and telephone
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This level of competition is not present nationwide. First, one would
need a sufficiently wide array of network practices and offerings to meet
every consumer's need.3
That degree of network-management
differentiation is unlikely, even in the most fiercely competitive markets.
Second, network-management practices would need to be a sufficiently
important factor in selecting a network provider. It is likely that price and
speed would outweigh network-management practices as a meaningful
32
difference for most customers.
In telecommunications, the long-distance and customer-premises
equipment market of the 1980s, with hundreds of competitors,
demonstrated that entry and price regulation were better handled by the
market.3 3 Even then, regulation persists. Prohibitions on slamming of
customers (i.e., misrepresenting that a customer had left one provider for
another), public safety mandates like E911 availability, and equipment
approval by FCC labs remain necessary.34
For broadband, it is unlikely that a market of sufficient facilitiesbased competition soon will develop nationwide so that the level of
competition will justify forbearing from regulation.3 5 While it can be
seriously argued that some consumers have a sufficient multiplicity of

companies would not be able to create a bidding war for access to the high-speed lanes."
Babette E.L. Boliek, Net Neutrality Regulation in the Mobile Telecommunications Market:
A Cautionary Tale from the Era of Price Regulation 3 (October 10, 2008) available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1129517
[hereinafter Net Neutrality
Regulation], (quoting Barack Obama, Network Neutrality Podcast (June 8, 2006) (transcript
availableat http://obama.senate.gov/podcast/060608-networkneutrality/print.php)).
31. It could be argued that an unbundling requirement, where the network provider sells
transport to ISPs, would lead to more network-management offerings. But there is no
evidence that that occurred when DSL was subject to an unbundling requirement or that
network-management practices in countries subject to unbundling are key differentiators
among competitors. See Next Generation Connectivity: A Review of Broadband Internet
Transitions and Policy from Around the World, The Berkman Center, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/BerkmanCenterBroadbandStudy_ 130ct09.pdf.
32. By way of comparison, consider the category of safety features in the competitive
automobile industry. While important, other criteria-price, fuel economy, style-as key
differences among products.
33. By 1980, the FCC unbundled customer premises equipment from services in order
to promote a competitive market for equipment, even if basic service was provided on a
monopoly basis. Second Computer Inquiry, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
34. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 225 (disability access to common carriers); 47 C.F.R. § 9.5
(VoIP E911 services); id., § 2.1031 (requirements for equipment certification).
35. Babette E.L. Boliek argues that viewed separately the competitive wireless
broadband market is itself competitive. Babette E.L. Boliek, Net Neutrality Regulation,
supra note 30, at 5 ("Regulators and analysts alike have consistently found the present-day
mobile communications market to be competitive. If indeed this is the case, it calls into
question the underlying rationale for network neutrality regulation with respect to mobile
communications.") (footnotes omitted).
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broadband choices, 6 it is yet to be demonstrated that most consumers do.
In larger markets, most consumers can choose between cable modem
service and either DSL or enhanced fiber service from the incumbent
telephone company. In several markets, there may be a second cable
operator offering a competitive modem service.3 7 Wireline alternatives
coming from broadband over power lines have proven to be illusory.
There are typically multiple wireless providers as well. 38 In this
category there may be private or publicly provided Wi-Fi, which has a
radius of service of 300 feet for sending and receiving, or larger, mesh
fourth generation (4G) WiMAX networks that encompass up to a thirtymile radius. 39 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) is developing for mobile and
fixed broadband. 4°
But, it is yet to be shown that most customers have more than two
facilities-based broadband providers (even if we can agree on a definition
of "broadband")-i.e., the local cable and telephone companies. The
national broadband mapping effort will help pinpoint where the
competition is, but, until that work is completed, national policy cannot
assume a competitive market.4 ' Indeed, some areas have only one wireline
36. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Fifth Report, 23
F.C.C.R. 9615, 9632 para. 35 (2008). This FCC annual report on broadband availability
identifies that a zip code is served by a broadband provider so long as one customer in the
zip code obtains service. The (misleading) result is that some zip codes can report a
multiplicity of wireless competitors, even though the competitors do not serve the entire zip
code.
37. "As of June 2005, a [second wireline video provider] served approximately 1.4
million subscribers, representing 1.5 percent of all MVPD households." Annual Assessment
of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Twelfth
Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, para. 14 (2006).
38. Clearwire is poised to provide a competitive wireless broadband offering in many
markets, using a consortium of cable operators, Sprint, and Google to assist in the buildout
and marketing. See Clearwire, http://www.clearwire.com (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
39. 2 Daniel L. Brenner, Monroe E. Price & Michael I. Meyerson, CABLE TELEVISION &
OTHER NoN-BROADCAST VIDEO § 18.6 (2009).
40. See W. David Gardner, Information Week, Verizon Wireless Establishes LTE
Development Center (Apr. 1, 2009) available at http://www.informationweek.com/
news/mobility/business/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=216402321.
41. The Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information
Administration administers the State Broadband Data and Development Grant Program is a
matching grant program that implements the joint purposes of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act and the Broadband Data Improvement Act (BDIA). The program
provides grants to assist states or their designees in gathering and verifying state-specific
data on the availability, speed, location, and technology type of broadband services. The
data they collect and compile will also be used to develop publicly available statewide
broadband maps and to inform the comprehensive, interactive, and searchable national
broadband map that NTIA is required by the Recovery Act to create and make publicly
available by February 17, 2011. Press Release, Commerce Department's NTIA Awards
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provider (or none), and very rural customers have broadband only from
satellite-based services using a satellite downstream and a telephone
upstream (or return) path.42 Funding through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 hopes to provide access to broadband to 100
percent of Americans. But funding is not directed to ensuring multiple
providers to each location.43
So it is unlikely that the FCC or broadband networks can argue that
facilities-based competition makes questions of network regulation moot.
Moreover, when the FCC has forborne from regulation because of
sufficient competition, it has done so around issues like price, entry, and
44
exit regulation or issues of access to elements of a competitor's network.
It is not clear that competition among providers will produce management
or pricing practices that will meet the standard of sufficient competition.
Furthermore, network neutrality involves policies that do not necessarily
translate to traditional measures of consumer surplus. For example, it may
be more efficient to price by the amount of bits traveling upstream and
downstream, but that is not how the "all you can eat" ISP works. Allowing
ISPS to charge content providers for quality of service (QoS) might lower
the costs of subscribing. Similarly, management practices that foster greater
diversity may be preferred to those that maximize efficiency.
Consider this example: Suppose a significant population really does
have three wireline ISPs and five wireless ISPs-pretty competitive in
terms of how to connect to the Internet. But suppose that all of these
providers adopt a business model that allows Web sites to pay for faster
access to their Web sites (QoS) rather than the "best efforts" otherwise
provided by each network provider. Web sites that cannot or will not pay
for faster access will complain that this is not a competitive market for Web
Grants For Broadband Mapping and Planning in Alabama, Idaho, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming: Recovery Act Funding to Lay
Groundwork for Enhanced Internet Services, (Nov. 6, 2009) available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press/2009/BBMappinggrants_091106.html.
42. Still, there is increased competition, at least as reflected in the FCC's Broadband
Inquiry record. "Over 90% of U.S. households can choose from either a wireline or a cable
broadband service and approximately four-fifths of U.S. households have access to both. In
addition, mobile wireless broadband, from at last one of several providers, is available to
more than 95% of U.S. households." A NationalBroadbandPlanfor our Future,Comments
of the United States Telecom Ass'n, GN Docket No. 09-51 (filed June 8, 2009) at 3-4,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeorjpdf=pdf&id_
document=6520220030.
43. Congress charged the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service and the
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration
with making grants and loans to expand broadband deployment and for other important
broadband projects. Congress provided $7.2 billion for this effort. American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 160 requires that the FCC forbear from Title II common carrier
regulation where competition is sufficient.
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sites, even if it is quite competitive for subscribers (or at least subscribers
who do not care about whether ISPs charge for QoS.)
Or let us assume that the standard business model for all eight
providers requires a customer to opt in to ISP tracking of Web visits as a
condition of service so the ISP can develop an advertising profile of the
customer for third parties. If no consumer could access the Internet without
giving up this information, the generally anonymous Web surfing that has
characterized the Internet for many would be lost. Competition theory
would suggest that this condition would not last forever; if there was a
significant market differentiation in offering customers a way to opt out of
such tracking, it would emerge. But, until and unless it did, it would be
hard to pin hopes on competition.
In any case, there are not markets with this many broadband ISP
choices. If anything, policymakers aspire to insure that all Americans have
access to at least one or perhaps two ISPs. And, apart from having access to
broadband through market or government-subsidized deployment, there is
still the task of getting greater adoption, which is the focus of the FCC's
National Broadband Plan efforts.45 Congress has not concluded that the
market is sufficiently competitive. Indeed, in the 1996 Act, Congress
instructed the FCC to reduce regulation in order to spur more broadband
deployment.46
So, while it would be desirable to leave broadband network practices
to market forces (as we do with many other aspects of communications
service choice), that conclusion is hard to reach here. There simply is
insufficient intra and intermodal competition among broadband ISPs. But
does an inadequate degree of competition leave the field open for the FCC
to engage in broad regulation of network practices? Or does the "do no
harm" admonition apply here?

45. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009), charged the FCC to create a national broadband plan by February 2010 "to
ensure that every American has access to broadband capability and establishes clear
benchmarks for meeting that goal." A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Gen. Docket
No. 09-51, FCC 09-31 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-09-31Al.pdf The FCC convened dozens of workshops to consider
various issues raised by its broad inquiry notice, including management questions raised in
this Article.
46. Section 706 of the 1996 Act, while sometimes used by the FCC as a jurisdictional
hook to regulate cable, is really designed to urge deregulation if that is what it takes to
increase broadband service. See generally47 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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III. THE FCC's EXPERIENCE WITH PRESCRIPTIVE RULES BODES
POORLY FOR REGULATORY INTERVENTION
A.

The Origins of PrescriptiveRules-Radio Regulation

When Congress established the FCC in the 1930s, it was amidst a
Depression brought on partly by government's failure to regulate financial
markets.4 7 It was to be expected that the agency would develop rules to
enforce exclusivity for radio frequencies, for example, so that a grant to
one licensee would not interfere with another licensee. Over time,
prescriptive, or ex ante, rules were adopted to flesh out the meaning of
public-interest programming, especially where contests for radio and, later,
television licenses required the development of comparative-licensing
criteria to distinguish among applicants. Program content was one of the
48
early criteria, but he FCC sought less subjective criteria over time.
The idea that matters of this type-how to settle interference disputes
or to grant a radio license-could be turned over to market forces was not
part of any recorded thinking by the agency. Instead, nonmarket criterialike integration of ownership with management or local presence in the
community (along with somewhat more defensible criteria, such as degree
of media concentration)--determined who would be awarded a license if
contested by two or more applicants.4 9 It did not matter that the license
could be transferred thirty-six months later or that the FCC never did check
up on whether the licensees actually remained in the community.
Over time, the regulatory impulse was tempered and a more
marketplace-oriented approach arrived, forced by Congress' 1997 decision
to require that new stations be awarded based on competitive bidding,5 °
eliminating the need for comparative criteria.5 Although broadcasting

47. See generally 1 ERiK BARNOuw, A TOWER IN BABEL (1966).
48. The FCC's authority to consider programming was established in Great Lakes
Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Great
Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281
U.S. 706 (1930) (establishing programming service as one of the public interest criteria to
be used in radio station renewals).
49. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 918 (1965); Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings,
Public Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965) ("Diversification of control is a public good in a
free society, and is additionally desirable where a government licensing system limits access
by the public to the use of radio and television facilities.").
50. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 3002(a), Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 258
(1997), 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2006). See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.5000-5009 (2008).
51. The Supreme Court had required that all similarly situated, mutually exclusive
applications be accorded a comparative hearing. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327 (1945). Comparative criteria were spelled out in Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, PublicNotice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
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remains content-regulated, perhaps best illustrated by cases concerning
indecent content,52 the use of content criteria is all but gone from broadcast
license grants.
The point to be remembered is this: the agency's most visible activity,
broadcast regulation, began as a highly prescriptive one in terms of
licensing and content. Eventually, that impulse in licensing was throttled
back. As academics recognized decades earlier, 53 and as Congress did by
1997, a highly regulatory approach to licensing was neither inevitable nor
necessarily the best method of issuing licenses to use spectrum.
B. The FCC'sSuccess with Laissez FaireRegulation in Creating
New Services
Unlike other areas of federal regulation recently, the record of laissez
faire FCC licensing regulation is a bright one if we accept as the criterion
for success rapid development of an incipient technology. There have been
different licensing approaches based on market demand. The FCC's
auction authority permits spectrum demand to be met with market
mechanisms.5 4 But, even outside of auctions, the FCC succeeded in
launching new services by not adopting a highly regulatory licensing
scheme. Consider these four categories: domestic satellites, direct
broadcast satellites, local/long-distance telephone entry, and broadband
policy prior to the network neutrality debate.
1.

Open Skies

A leading example of a successful network creation is the Open Skies
policy 55 toward communications satellite launch and operation during the
1970s. These first domestic satellites (domsats) provided voice and video
circuits to compete with AT&T long-haul trunk services and eventually led

52. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008), rev'd, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009).
53. Coase, supra note 19, at 14; Leo Herzel, "PublicInterest" and the Market in Color
Television Regulation, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 802 (1951).
54. When the auction comes with nonmarket requirements, that mechanism can fail.
The FCC conditioned auction of the so-called D block of frequencies in the 700 MHz range,
on the winner building a network that interconnects with emergency communication
equipment across the nation. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, & 777-792 MHz
Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15289 (2007). See Alejandro Valencia, The
FCC's Regulatory Mulligan: Exploring the Options in the Wake of a Failed D Block
Auction, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 313 (2009).
55. Establishment
of
Domestic
Communications-Satellite
Facilities
by
Nongovernmental Entities, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970); Second Report
and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
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to the widespread delivery of satellite-delivered, television-program
networks.
The policy predates auction authority. The rule simply was "the first
to file is first to be granted" so long as milestones were met and orbital arc
space was available for the satellites. The FCC could have launched a
proceeding to determine comparative criteria by which to award the
satellite licenses, which was the system in place for selecting television and
radio licensees.56 Satellites, after all, use radio communications to and from
earth and the satellite's transponders. But the FCC declined to adopt
comparative criteria. Satellite companies avoided the regulatory uncertainty
and delay that characterized the comparative licensing process used to
assign broadcast licenses. When the FCC faced the opportunity to use
comparative hearings to assess the merits of applicants in excess of what
the marketplace and the satellite orbital arc could accommodate, it
declined, ordering creation of a consortium instead.57
2.

Direct Broadcast Satellites

The FCC followed up this laissez faire approach in the next decade by
adopting first-come, first-served rules for direct broadcast satellite (DBS)
providers, who provide service directly to consumers rather than the variety
of retail, wholesale, and commercial customers receiving domsat
transmissions. And the FCC allowed DBS providers to choose their
regulatory identity. 58 They could operate more like broadcasters, subject to
the requirements of broadcast law, or they could hold themselves out as
common carriers, offering their service on a tariffed basis. As with
communications satellites, the available slots filled up quickly, although
DBS took time to develop because of a lack of funding, a relatively tight
grip on the subscription market by cable, and existing large-dish (so-called
C-Band) satellite providers already prevalent in rural areas. And the FCC
eventually replaced its first-come, first-served approach with an equally
deregulatory auction regime in 1995.59
56. See supra notes, 48-49.
57. Amendment of Parts 2, 22, and 25 of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate Spectrum for
& to Establish Other Rules & Policies Pertaining to the Use of Radio Frequencies in a Land
Mobile Satellite Serv. for the Provision of Various Common Carrier Servs., Memorandum
Opinion, Order,and Authorization, 4 F.C.C.R. 6041 (1989), rev'd, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1991), on remand, 7 F.C.C.R. 266 (1992).
58. Inquiry into the Dev. of Reg. Policy in Regard to D.B.S. for the Period Following
the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conf., Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 para. 86
(1982), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Broad. v. FCC, 740 F.2d
1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. Revision of Rules & Policies for the D.B.S. Serv., Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
9712 para. 7 (1995). The FCC took its action pursuant to auction authority created in 47
U.S.C. § 309(j).
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While the economic model took time to develop, by the mid-1990s,
DBS provided the first formidable challenge to the terrestrial cable
providers. Today, its success as an alternative video network regime to
cable is manifest: one in three customers of pay television (multichannel
video programming distributors, in statutory parlance) take DBS, not
cable.6 °
3.

Competitive Long-Distance and Local-Phone Competition

Another happy chapter where the FCC avoided excessive regulatory,
network-licensing rules concerns competitive phone providers. As with
satellites, the FCC's approach came amidst a technological development
that spawned the new service-here, the use of low-cost microwave
transmitters and receivers (and, eventually, satellite circuits) that provided a
facilities-based alternative to AT&T's Long Line trunks. In what became
known as the Competitive Carrier proceedings, the FCC, starting in 1980,
and ending with a halt called by the courts five years later, deregulated
emerging telecommunications carriers that possessed no market power. 6'
In hindsight, this approach seems obvious. Why regulate a new
provider when a customer dissatisfied with its price or quality can revert to
the regulated carrier? The FCC had to decide that either these new
companies, like MCI and Sprint, were not carriers and, therefore, not
subject to the unambiguous requirements to file tariffs, or forbear from
regulating them as nondominant carriers. It chose forbearance, an agency
prerogative that would not be codified until Section 10 was added in the
1996 Act. 62 The result was the development of a robust competitive longdistance market by entrants who might otherwise have been slowed
through attacks on their tariffs by entrenched incumbents.63
60. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 546, para. 8 (2009).
61. Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. &
Facils. Authorizations, FirstReport and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 para. 2 (1981); Second Report
and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 para. 1 (1982), recon.; 93 F.C.C.2d 54 para. 11; Third Report
and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46791 para. 4 (Oct. 6); Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554
para. 6 (1983); Fifth Report and Order,98 F.C.C.2d 1191 para. 5 (1984); Sixth Report and
Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 para. 11, rev'd sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Sixth Report and Order went too far in the court's view; Section
203 requires carriers to file service charges in the form of tariffs and the FCC forbade
nondominant carriers from filing. MCI's interest in appealing this apparent burden lifting
may have been based on its desire to prevent AT&T from eventually getting the same relief.
Were the FCC to do so, MCI would not have the benefit of devising favorable customer
rates based on an examination of AT&T's tariffs weeks before it could become effective.
765 F.2d 1186.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 160.
63. See FCC Industry Analysis & Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau,
Statistics Of The Long Distance Telecommunications Industry (2003); FCC News, May 14,
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4.

Broadband
The development of broadband itself has been an exercise in lessening
the regulatory strictures on providers by the FCC and others, including
Congress. As to the latter, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, first passed in
1998 for three years and extended since, 64 has produced one of the longest
tax holidays in U.S. history and made online retail a significant and
sustained competitor to the catalog and bricks-and-mortar retailers.65 While
it did not preempt state or local sales taxes, it did restrict Internet-specific
taxes, including taxes on broadband. Because it was not clear to whom a
sales tax was owed, however, it often has not been collected.66
The FCC's approach to broadband had been deregulatory through
much of the service's first decade. Three episodes of regulatory restraint
have contributed to the development of residential broadband service. First,
the FCC declined to require cable operators to provide access to
unaffiliated ISPs, thereby avoiding a wholesale grafting of the dial-up
Internet service model onto a platform that was entirely different. 67 Dial-up
access requires a telephone line to connect to a modem that converts
keystrokes transmitted over the phone line into impulses that are
transmitted to an Internet point of presence, onto the Internet cloud, and
finally to the sender's destination. 68 The phone company could not require

the dial-up user to direct her Internet traffic to its modem bank anymore
2003,
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCCStateLink/IAD/ldrptl03.pdf ("In 1984, AT&T's market share was about 90% of the toll
revenues reported by carriers that identify themselves as primarily long distance carriers. By
2001, AT&T's market share had declined to slightly less than 38%, MCI's share was almost
24%, Sprint's was 9%, the regional Bell operating company (RBOC) long distance affiliates
had over 6%, and more than 1,000 other long distance carriers had almost 24% of the
remaining market.").
64. Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121
Stat. 1024 (2007) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C § 151).
65. See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "A Five-Year Extension of The Internet
Tax Moratorium Would Further Erode The Tax Base of States And Localities" (2001),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/crns/?fa=view&id=351 ("An extension of the moratorium
in its current form for a period longer than two years is likely to affect adversely the ability
of state and local governments to reach and implement a solution that would allow Internet
sellers and Main Street sellers to be treated fairly with respect to sales tax collections.").
66. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which held that a state
cannot require an out-of-state merchant to charge sales tax to the state's residents unless the
seller has a physical presence, such as a warehouse or call center, within the state's borders.
Even if the merchant is not required to charge the tax, the purchaser is legally obligated to
self-remit the tax to the state revenue department. Of course, many purchasers are unaware
of this requirement or choose to ignore it.
67. CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, FCC, BROADBAND TODAY 8 (1999) available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
68. How the Internet Works: A Dialup Example, http://telecom.tbi.net/how-dial.htm
(last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
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than it could require every fax transmission to one of its own fax machines.
This ability to dial up any modem bank triggered the creation of thousands
of ISPs, often local, because the customer could call a local number under a
flat-rate residential phone plan and stay online for hours.
National dial-up ISPs, led by AOL and its thousands of local, phonenumber modem banks, led the charge for a physical accommodation on the
cable-modem plant. Cable's vastly larger upstream and downstream
capacity makes dial-up unacceptable for many bit-rich applications. While
some accommodations were done to placate competition regulators in the
context of merger approvals,69 the FCC, correctly, refused to force cable
operators to recreate the dial-up architecture. This refusal made sense
because the architecture was so different.70 There was no telephone call to
make comparable to the one that occurs in dial up. There was no need to
make the pass off to the Internet through a cheaper, local telephone
connection (the cable modem connection is always on). And there was no
unaffiliated modem bank that could compete with a telephone company's
modem bank. But many of the most vociferous network neutrality
advocates were certain that a failure to recreate 71
the dial-up model for
broadband would be destructive of Internet freedom.
Just the opposite occurred. Applications that could not have
developed by dial up arose due to an increasing residential broadband
market. Download services, like YouTube, would have developed more
slowly without broadband development because, as consumer services,
they rely on widespread, residential broadband.
The FCC dubbed its approach "vigilant restraint," and even went so
far as to avoide deciding the regulatory classification of the service until

69. In 2000, the FTC imposed ISP access as a condition for approving the Time
Warner-AOL merger. America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., Agreement Containing
Consent Orders; Decision and Order, FTC Dkt No. C-3989, 2000 WL 1843019 at para.
II.A.2 (Dec. 14,2000).
70. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 161
(2005):
"Opening" a cable network to independent ISPs becomes somewhat more
complicated if access means more than merely allowing them to serve as a user's
default home page. The basic challenge lies in the fact that-unlike telephone
networks, with their dedicated loops to each end user-cable networks employ an
Ethemet-type (or "bus") configuration similar to that used in office LANs.
71. The research director of the Consumer Federation of America, Mark Cooper, said
the absence of mandated access is "bad policy because it will destroy the Internet." Jerri
Stroud, FCCRuling Will ProduceLower Billsfor Users of Cable Modems, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 15, 2002, at C8. See also BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 67, at 11
("Among the supporters of 'open access' are coalitions of ISPs, led by America Online
(AOL), MindSpring Enterprises (MindSpring) and other ISP companies. ISP advocates are
concerned that the owners of a closed networks will be able to exercise control over the
content and navigational services that the Internet offers.").
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court cases placed the question directly to the agency.7 The FCC
formalized the lightly regulated status of cable-modem service by declaring
it an interstate information service as opposed to a more highly regulated
category of either a telecommunications service or a cable service. This
latter classification might have placed it under the control of local
franchising authorities, who sought the classification at the time.
The FCC proceeded to reclassify the telephone companies' digital
subscriber line (DSL) and wireless services as "information services,"
which removed any obligation (but not the voluntary ability) to offer
wholesale transmission to unaffiliated ISPs.73 But the dial-up model ill fit
these technologies as well, and build-out and adoption of broadband soared
as cable and telephone companies competed (and continue to compete
today) on service, speed, and price.
C. On the Other Hand: The Failureof PrescriptiveEx Ante
Network Design
In the cases of satellites, competitive phone services, and broadband
cable, the FCC took a regulatory laissez faire approach to authorization and
operation, with success stories in terms of launching new services and
promoting intermodal competition. It is difficult to prove conclusively that
the light-touch regulatory approach caused the success of these newtechnology services. The correlation is strong, though. In the examples that
follow, one finds failure, not success, when the agency tried to establish a
comprehensive regulatory scheme to dictate network-services development.
1.

Video Dialtone

Perhaps the FCC's most blatant attempt to define network rules is in
its creation of a video dialtone service, which led to absolutely no
sustainable competition to cable.74 This all-but-forgotten service was
72. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the ISP service offered by cable operators under the "@Home" brand was a
telecommunications service). This led to the FCC decision that the service was a Title I
"information service," a conclusion affirmed in Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005).
73. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 para.
2-3 (2005), aff'd sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir.
2007).
74. See Tel. Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Sec. 63.54-63.58, FurtherNotice of
ProposedRulemaking, First Report and Order, and Second FurtherNotice of Inquiry, 7
F.C.C.R. 300, para. 1 (1991), recon., 7 F.C.C.R. 5069, para. 1 (1992), af'd, Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Second Report and Order,
Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781, para. 1 (1992). The rules are discussed in Tel. Co.-Cable TV CrossOwnership Rules, Sec. 63.54-63.58, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration
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designed so telephone companies (who were forbidden by cross-ownership
prohibitions from operating cable systems at the time) could offer
competitive video. Under video dialtone rules, a telephone company was
permitted to offer, on a nondiscriminatory basis, a common carrier video
delivery platform that would accommodate multiple video programmers
and expand as demand increased. It could also enter into non-ownership
relationships with video programmers to provide unregulated "gateways"
to help customers select and receive video from those programmers.
Telephone companies could also acquire up to a five percent financial
interest in a programmer.
What would have made the most sense (and which Congress
eventually authorized) was direct entry into video by telephone companies,
which, in fairness, the FCC also recommended at the time it promulgated
its video dialtone order. Nevertheless, instead of leaving it at that
legislative recommendation, the FCC believed it could define and architect
a service to facilitate new entry on plant that existing telephone networks
would build. Service never materialized in part because of challenges to
whether the telco had lawfully separated the video and telephone plant.
Without proper separation, the rules allowed for the possibility of crosssubsidies from phone customers to pay for construction of the video
network, which engendered a separate set of regulatory battles that slowed
down whatever momentum telcos had to introduce the new service.75
2.

Open Video Systems
A subsequent attempt to design a successor service to video dialtone
arose with Congress' creation of the "open video system" (OVS)
architecture in the 1996 Act. Congress did not subject companies applying
to operate OVS to the sweep of telephone-company regulation under Title
II. Indeed, the goal of the service was to subject providers to "reduced
regulatory burdens. 76 Nevertheless, it created a structure for OVS that
failed in the market. Like video dialtone, the OVS operator has to provide
capacity for unaffiliated program packagers to offer a package of channels.
Unlike video dialtone, and hoping to make OVS more successful than its
and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 244 (1994). By 1996,
Congress had ordered the FCC to shut video dialtone down. Telecommunications Act of
1996 § 302(b), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 124 (1996) ("The Commission's regulations
and policies with respect to video dialtone requirements... shall cease to be effective on the
date of enactment of this Act.").
75. See Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish Competitive Serv. Safeguards
for LEC Provision of Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Orderon Remand, and Waiver Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 16639, 16707, n.21 (1996).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 573(c) (2006). Congress ordered the FCC to terminate video dialtone,
delete its regulations from its rulebook, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.58 (1995), and replace the
service with OVS.
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predecessor service, the OVS operator may offer its own programming
packages on the network.
The OVS operator does not have complete freedom to operate its
network, even after it meets the requirement to provide capacity to others.
For instance, the law prohibits an OVS operator from providing itself and
its affiliates with a marketing advantage vis-A-vis other video programming
providers on the system in the way it distributes material or information for
purposes of program selection." Rates charged to users are presumptively
valid so long as the OVS provider follows a Rube Goldberg-like condition:
at least one unaffiliated program provider must occupy capacity on the
OVS system equal to the lesser of one-third of the system capacity of that
occupied by the OVS operator and its affiliates and the rate must not be
higher than the average of the rates paid by all unaffiliated providers. If
these conditions are met, the burden shifts to the complainant to
demonstrate that the rate is not just and reasonable.78
And, when demand for capacity exceeds supply, the FCC was
required by statute to bar the OVS network from "selecting" video
programming services on more than one-third of channel capacity. 79 But,
because the price of the service also has to be nondiscriminatory under
Section 653(b), 80 it is quite possible that demand could exceed supply;
whereas, a price-discriminatory treatment would allow demand to equal
supply and avoid a false shortage. The OVS operator would be capped on
its channel usage under these terms.
While many companies filed for OVS authorization-the FCC has a
streamlined system for issuing certificates within ten working days of
filing-by 2006, not one programmer had come forward to pay for
carriage; the model of network sharing had failed. 81 As a model for thirdparty access to the OVS platform, the scheme did not bring on competition
in the form government had devised.

77. 47 U.S.C. § 573(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006). For restrictions applied to navigational devices,
guides, and menus used by the subscriber in active program selection, see Implementation
of Sec. 302 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Order on Remand, 14 F.C.C.R. 19700 (1999).
78. Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Order on Remand,
11 F.C.C.R. 20227, para. 77 (1996), rev'd in part and remanded,City of Dallas v. FCC, 165
F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 573(b)(1)(B) (2006).
80. Communications Act of 1934 § 653(b), 47 U.S.C. § 573(b) (2006).
81. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, para. 88 n.334 (2006) ("We
are not aware of any OVS operator carrying programming offered by an unaffiliated
program packager."); Ted Hearn, 'Open Video Systems' a Turn Off, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, at 45, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/122277_Open Video Systems A TurnOff.php.
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Advanced Instant Messaging

A last example of the FCC's failure to anticipate a viable network
architecture arose in the context of the (ill-fated) AOL-Time Warner
merger in 2001 .82 The FTC had imposed ISP open-access conditions in
approving the merger. The FCC imposed access conditions on the merged
company's "advanced Instant Messaging," even though the "advanced"
technology did not even exist.8 3 AOL's Instant Messaging dominance
dissipated when the feature was duplicated by Microsoft and others, and
the advanced technology dreamed up by the FCC actually emerged as an
edge-provided service (i.e., Twitter and its competitors). The FCC quietly
rescinded its advanced messaging requirement in 2003. 84

D. Summary
The foregoing examples show a pattern of regulatory success when
the FCC left network technologies alone. They show a pattern of regulatory
failure when the FCC tried to anticipate how network services would
develop and defined a network framework. It suggests that the FCC is a
poor draftsman in designing networks or contemplating add ons. In the next
Section, this Article will explore why the FCC can be expected to do little
better in developing access or management regimes for existing networks.
IV. DETERMINING "REASONABLE" NETWORK REGULATION IS

HARD TO Do IF You Do NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL THE
NETWORK

A.

The Problem of Sufficient Information

Network neutrality advocates turn to the FCC because the agency
enjoys a reputation for expertise. And, as an independent agency, it fills a
less political role in self-government that differs from the processes of the
executive or legislative branches.8 5 To exercise expertise in the network
context-for instance, to establish network rules ex ante to determine what
constitutes reasonable behavior by the network operator-a knowledge
82. App'ns for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547 paras. 191200 (2001).
83. Id.
84. App'ns for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee; Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for Relief From the Condition
Restricting Streaming Video AlIS, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 16835
(2003).
85. See JAMES M. LANDIs, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
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base must be assumed. It is critical to have a fairly precise view of the
network, from how it was designed to how it operates to what tools the
network operator has at its disposal for managing its business.
In the United States, it has been difficult for the FCC to match the
knowledge about privately constructed communications networks that their
operators possess. Networks are designed primarily to operate efficiently,
not to provide transparency to regulators. In this respect, other
governments' regulators may enjoy an advantage. That is because in most
countries, telephone networks (and even some cable networks, such as
Germany) were constructed by the state telecommunications authority. The
architects and planners were the regulators to a significant degree. In the
United States, phone and cable networks have been almost entirely
constructed by private entities. The FCC built none of them.
So, the FCC is perpetually the outsider looking in whenever it tries to
fully understand the constituent parts of communications networks or why
networks evolved the way they have. This dim visibility applies especially
for networks that were built entirely with private capital, as cable and
wireless networks have been. The FCC may establish certain construction
rules-for example, ensuring that any radio frequencies involved in
systems do not interfere with other radio frequency users. 86 But there are
many aspects, especially the choice of equipment used to provide and
manage the service, 81 that are unregulated. Indeed, the construction of
broadband Internet connectivity on cable networks occurred absent any
regulatory mandates.88
Even during the heyday of overseeing telephone rates, the FCC had
difficulty determining whether the networks were built without excessive
investment and, therefore, producing for AT&T an improper return on that
investment. This was not for lack of trying, however.

86. Aeronautical frequencies share bandwidth with cable, and rules require plant
shielding to avoid interference with stiff penalties for violations. Amendment of Part 76 of
the Commission's Rules to Add Frequency ChannelingRequirements and Restrictions and
to Require Monitoringfor Signal Leakage form Cable Television Systems, 99 F.C.C.2d 512
(1984), modified, 101 F.C.C.2d 117 (1985).
87. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 3. One of the issues in the
Comcast complaint was the choice of equipment used to throttle traffic. Id. Companies like
Cisco and Sandvine offer services that may turn out to be unacceptable network
management practices. But unless the FCC is going to start approving ex ante which
suppliers may be contained in a network, it cannot know all the features that a network
operator may be able to deploy.
88. For a history of how cable modem service began, see ROUZBEH YASSINI, PLANET
BROADBAND 39-40 (2004) (describing how a cable engineer in 1993 demonstrated access
to one of six known Web sites on the planet.).
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The Communications Act requires that "charges" for certain
telecommunications services be "just and reasonable." 89 Rather than
auditing charges directly, regulators look at the constituent parts of the
provider's rate base, particularly at how much is spent on capital
investments and ongoing expenses. 90 During the era of the "continuing
surveillance" of price regulation of the AT&T telephone monopoly, the
FCC was thus required to determine whether capital expenditures and
annual expenses were reasonable. The FCC expended considerable multiyear resources in the 1930s on the belief that a thorough examination
would show that AT&T was "gold plating" its network to boost its returns
and had excessive expenses. The FCC concluded that was not the case. 91
While this may be true, its task was exceedingly difficult. The FCC had to
master networks whose architecture, nomenclature, and functionality were
and are designed for purposes that have nothing to do with providing
regulatory transparency. And, in a rate-regulated context, obscuring the
network architecture may have advantages to the regulated entity's return.
In short, the FCC staff, and even more likely, its five politically
appointed commissioners, cannot be expected to know the ins and outs of a
communications network, even if under our administrative system the FCC
is the likeliest branch of government to be tasked with knowing about such
things. And, unless the FCC actually operates the network, it is often left in
the position of second-guessing the judgments of the operator.

89. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
90. A carrier's annual revenue requirement (RR) (from which the list of charges, or
tariff, is created) is established by allowing a return (r) on capital investment (V), plus
reasonable expenses (E), plus taxes (T) and interest payments for the cost of.capital (I).
Thus, RR = rV + E + T + I. See Competitive Carrier, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 n.13 (1981).
91. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, FirstReport and Order,
4 F.C.C.R. 2873, para. 20 (1989):
During the period when the "continuing surveillance" policy was in effect, a voice
occasionally was raised in complaint that the Bell System's costs and rates might
be too high, but only once during this period did this Commission initiate a
comprehensive investigation of such matters. This inquiry in the late 1930s cost
millions of dollars and occupied approximately 300 researchers for several years.
The staff's efforts culminated in the preparation of a voluminous report on Bell
System costs and operations, but allegations of inflated costs and rates -and
substantial cost shifting between unregulated Western Electric and regulated
telephone company operations-were never documented to the Commission's
satisfaction. Ultimately, no action was taken on the report's major
recommendations, and the investigation produced no significant changes in
Commission or Bell System procedures.
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The FCC's current mantra to be data driven in decision making is a
broad recognition that 92the FCC needs data from outside sources; it does not
possess the data itself.
B. The Problem ofDevising Solutions to PerceivedNetwork
Problems
As the "advanced Instant Messaging" condition of the AOL-Time
Warner merger demonstrated, the FCC can be wildly off base in dictating
93
network conditions based on an erroneous prediction about the market.
But let us assume the market conditions suggest that competition would be
enhanced by creating a regulatory access scheme. It turns out that
implementing successful regulations is an enormous undertaking. In the
FCC's history, this challenge arose in different contexts.
Among the most significant examples of trying to establish network
access were the Computer Inquiries and implementation of the 1996 Act's
requirement to provide its own network elements to competitors. These are
worth studying, at least briefly, to see how the FCC has dealt with
regulating networks. In the first case, the incumbent wanted to expand into
services beyond mere transmission and had to promise access to
unaffiliated parties if allowed. In the second, an unaffiliated party needed
access to the incumbent's facilities to launch its own competitive
transmission service.
1.

The Computer Inquiry Proceedings

The ComputerInquiry proceedings arose out of a desire on the part of
AT&T to expand beyond providing transport of voice or data between
point A and point B and offer some data processing capacity. Under the
terms of a 1956 settlement to the Department of Justice's antitrust action
against AT&T, AT&T agreed to steer clear of computing services of the
type IBM then offered and stick to transmission. 94 As time progressed and
92. "This will be a deeply fact-based and data-driven process. We're bringing experts
in-house and reaching out to external academic partners." Statement of Chairman Julius
Genachowski, Federal Communications Commission, All-Hands Meeting on Broadband
Workshops, August 5, 2009, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/DOC-292583Al.pdf.
93. To that, one could add another condition of the merger, requiring Time Warner
Cable to provide third-party access to unaffiliated ISPs. In practice, the requirement was not
a network-access condition, but really a requirement to allow ISPs like EarthLink (and
AOL) to market and resell Time Warner Cable's broadband service under its own name. All
of the ISP network functions continued to be furnished by Time Warner Cable. Am. Online
Inc., & Time Warner Inc., Decision and Order, FTC Docket No. C-3989 (2000), available
at http://www2.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.
94. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cases (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J.
1956). The agreement settled the federal governments 1949 antitrust suit alleging attempted
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computing merged with communications, AT&T had aspirations beyond
being a "dumb pipe." It sought a regulatory solution that, with sufficient
safeguards, would permit it to provide enhanced services, such as
voicemail and what came to be the most significant enhanced service, ISP
access to the Internet."
In Computer II, the FCC authorized AT&T and other telephone
companies to enter the enhanced-services market subject to two wellintentioned conditions.9 First, the FCC imposed structural separation: the
largest telephone companies (AT&T and GTE) could provide enhanced
services only through a separate corporate subsidiary. Second, a telephone
company wanting to offer enhanced service had to offer its transmission
service to all unaffiliated ISPs requesting it on a tariffed basis. The
enhanced-service side of the telco had to purchase transmission service
itself as if it were an arms-length distance from the transmission company.
The goal was to prevent AT&T's ownership of its transmission capacity
from giving it an unfair advantage-through cross-subsidy or
97
discriminatory treatment-as it entered the enhanced services market.
Computer IIs concept of unbundling can be credited with one significant
success: the creation of separate ISPs as a class of enhanced services that
could count on the unbundled availability of the telcos' transmission
service. It also carried the concept of unbundling to customer-premises
equipment, which led to the innovation and reduced cost for telephone
handsets, answering machines, and other equipment.9 8 And, conceptually, it
helped regulators recognize how the transport layer differed from the
applications riding upon it.

monopolization of telecommunications equipment and services through the manner in which
the Bell System obtained and licensed its patents.
95. In addition to seeking relief through the Computer Inquiries, AT&T obtained
modification of the 1956 decree, titled Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), United States
v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,226-234 (D.D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
The modification also settled a 1974 antitrust suit brought by the federal government
alleging monopolization of both long-distance service and manufacture of
telecommunications equipment.
96. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs., Tentative
Decision and FurtherNotice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979), Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), reconsidered in, Memorandum Opinion and Order 84
FCC 2d 50 (1980), further reconsideredin, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further
Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Comm'n's Indus.
Ass'n v. FCC 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
97. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries,55 FED. COMM. L. J. 167, 195 (2003).
98. Computer and Comm'ns Indus. Ass'n, 693 F.2d 198 (boosting the importance of
the FCC's Part 68 rules, established in 1975, 47 C.F.R. § 68, which created technical
standards by which any manufacturer could sell equipment to the public and insist on
AT&T's cooperation in allowing customers to attach to the network).
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But its implementation raised problems; structural separation was
short lived. 99 AT&T convinced the FCC that the costs of structural
separation exceeded their benefits, which led to Computer III. The FCC
created "non-structural" safeguards that added enormous complexity to
how the network was viewed by both regulators and parties seeking to
access it. Networks had to define their "open network architecture" (ONA)
so that competing, enhanced-service providers could know the following:
the configuration of the telephone's infrastructure, basic service elements
(BSEs) that would define the network's building blocks; and comparatively
efficient interconnection (CEI) so that outsiders could attach to essential
facilities as easily as the network owner did.100
The FCC encountered considerable difficulty in sustaining its position
both legally and practically.'0' ONA plans were submitted and
resubmitted. 10 2 There is little evidence that the scheme actually led to the
blueprint model for access that the FCC envisioned.
The 1996 Act's interconnection and unbundled network element
(UNE) requirements essentially put the telephone companies out of their
ONA/CEI misery.l0 3 It is hard to find a single example where the Computer
III non-structural safeguards process led to a transparent and successful
enhanced market for unaffiliated parties. Instead, it led to a battle over the
sufficiency of the network's ONA showing, a process reminiscent of what
may arise were regulators to try to develop ex ante rules of network
behavior in broadband.
2.

Unbundled Network Elements

While the 1996 Act did not repeal the ComputerInquiry III rules (as it
did for video dialtone), the rules ceased to be competitively significant.
Instead, the Act focused on providing elements of an incumbent's network

99. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 70, at 154. "The short life of the structural
separation requirement reflected both the deregulatory climate of the mid-1980s and, more
generally, an abiding ambivalence about how to balance the efficiencies of vertical
integration against the potential dangers." Id.
100. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'ns Rules and Regs., Report and
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), rev'd sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1228-29
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the FCC had failed to explain satisfactorily how circumstances
had changed to justify substituting nonstructural for structural separation requirements). The
FCC reaffirmed its intention to impose ONA. See Filing and Review of Open Network
Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 3103 (1990).
101. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).
102. See, e.g., BellSouth Open Network Architecture Plan Amendment, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 5092 (2003).
103. See Valencia, supranote 54.

Number 1]

BROADBAND NETWORK REGULATION

for use by competitive telephone providers. °4 With flourishing
competitive, last-mile telephone connections, ONA blueprints allowed
enhanced-service providers (rechristened "information service" providers
by the Act)'0 5 to worry less about how open the incumbent's platform was;
competitive transport would, in theory, check the incumbent's penchant to
behave in a discriminatory manner. To achieve competitive entry, however,
Congress directed the FCC to identify network elements that incumbent
telephone companies would have to provide on an unbundled basis, socalled UNEs 10 6 or, as a group platform, UNE-P.
In 1996, the FCC established the list of UNEs'0° and an
accompanying very low-cost price formula for leasing these UNEs (socalled TELRIC).10 8 These decisions triggered nearly a decade of
unparalleled contention at the FCC as to whether the statute required the
pricing and availability that the FCC had granted competitors to incumbent
networks.' 9 Incumbents derided UNE-P as synthetic competition created
by law, which would never lead to facilities-based competition and,
instead, acted as a disincentive to build facilities by offering them at
bargain-basement, government-enforced rates. Competitors who took
advantage of UNE-P (such as MCI and the 1990s-era AT&T, when both
were trying to create local service to complement their long-distance
offerings) saw it as, at the worst, an interim step. As their businesses built,
these and other competitors could switch from leasing the incumbent's
facilities to building their own. In the meantime, there would be some
measure of retail competition where, otherwise, there was none.
Let us put aside the merits of each side. For our purposes, we should
focus on the ability of the FCC to achieve a legally sustainable consensus
104. The emphasis is found in the requirements of 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52, spelling out the
duties of incumbent and competitive local exchange carriers.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
106. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), 252(d)(1). See also 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) (defining "network
element").
107. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, FirstReport and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 para. 366 (1996).
108. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b) (2008). "Total element long-run incremental cost
(TELRIC)" focuses relentlessly on forward looking, not historical costs. It instructs state
agencies, which are to price the UNEs, to base the cost of the elements to the competitor on
what it would cost a hypothetical "most efficient" carrier to build the network. Id. The
standard was upheld in Verizon Commun 'ns Inc. v. FCC. 535 U.S. 467 (2002). While there
was considerable dispute over whether the FCC or the state regulators were in charge of
establishing these rules, federal authority was ultimately established by the Supreme Court.
AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). The debate is reminiscent of the question of
federal authority over broadband network providers.
109. The legal fights between the incumbents and competitors began with the question of
the FCC's authority to set pricing terms, resolved in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525
U.S. 366 (1999), rev'g 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), which found FCC authority, reversing
an Eighth Circuit view coming out the opposite way.
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on the issues of access to IJNEs and pricing. It started the task in 1996 and
ended it in 2005, when competitors generally lost the right to get UNE-P at
TELRIC prices. The last attempt, in 2003, after numerous court reversals,
was a 3-2 decision spanning 485 pages and 2,447 footnotes, with the
Chairman in dissent to the majority's plan to preserve UNE-P." ° The
appellate court reversed this last version,"' and the government sought no
further appeal. Even with individually approved authority to engage in the
process of identifying elements and pricing them, the FCC failed to
develop a sustainable regime.
Part of the fault may lie with Congress' failure to specify, in the 1996
Act, what elements should have been included and how they might be
ordered to be combined. 1 2 But the multiple losses by the FCC on review
by the courts"' evidence that the task posed by the statute-separating,
recombining, and pricing of network elements-did not translate into
viable regulation. Even if the policy made as much sense in 2004 as it did
agency never achieved much beyond a "prolonged
at the outset in 1996, the
'' 14
period of uncertainty."
C.

The Problem of Technology as an Independent Variable

As the foregoing demonstrates, regulatory agencies seeking to place
controls on networks face the challenge of not knowing enough about
network architecture and not being able to draw sustainable lines within the
network even when they think they do. Satisfying the former does not
always solve the latter. The failure of Computer III may have been the
result of the regulator's inability to draw ONA plans itself. The UNE-P
regime failed, however, not over what constituted a network element, but
whether the FCC could fashion a lasting regime to determine when (and for
how long) they should be provided at wholesale prices to competitors who
would package and resell them. In both cases, regulation failed.

110. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of
ProposedRulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Errata,18 F.C.C.R. 19020 (2003).
111. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
112. Nuechterlein and Weiser concluded that "the telecommunications world could
remain in this regulatory limbo for so long" because of the "exceptionally lawyer-driven
nature of this industry." NuECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 70, at 99. They add,
"[W]hatever its substantive merit, the [2003] Orderwas not the FCC's finest moment as an
institution." Id.at 107.
113. The FCC's first 1996 attempt was rebuffed in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board. 525
U.S. 366, 387-88 (1999). The second effort was invalidated in United States Telecom Ass 'n
v. FCC. 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
114. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 70, at 99.
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Nevertheless, just as UNE-P was being dismantled, competitive
facilities-based service developed-VolP, both on telephone DSL lines
and, significantly for intermodal competition, on cable broadband. Not only
did unaffiliated companies like Vonage and Skype provided service, but
also, eventually, the cable broadband providers themselves offered
telephone service." 5
In retrospect, it is clear that, while the gargantuan legal fights over
UNE-P consumed the attention of the FCC, a technology solution was
developing, an Internet-protocol-based telephone service. Voice over
Internet protocol (VoIP) offered by cable companies (and over-the-top
providers like Vonage via a broadband connection) constituted a facilitiesbased competitor, and a market-based answer to a situation that was tying
regulators in knots. The FCC was at the mercy of the obligations imposed
on it by the 1996 Act and could not easily bow out once the disputes
started. But the policy goal of retail telephone competition was indisputably
achieved through technological development occurring independently of
the regulator, not through the agency's management of an incumbent's
network.
Because technology is an independent vector, the regulation of
networks can distort how technology develops. Such efforts may not only
misdirect agency resources toward a futile end, but they can also impede
technological progress; the regulated entity focuses on what will satisfy the
federal agency, not on what works best. Such misdirection on the
company's end frustrates innovation at the physical network
layer and
6
inviting regulation at other, previously unregulated layers."

115. The first cable, Internet-protocol phone service was offered by Time Warner Cable;
the industry's largest company, Comcast, did not begin to offer service until two years later.
Vonage, an "over-the-top" provider, began service earlier than either cable company. See
Vonage and VoIP: A Look At Their History, http://ezinearticles.com/?Vonage-And-VoIP--A-Look-At-Their-History&id=286276 (last viewed Dec. 9, 2009); see also Press Release,
Time Warner, Time Warner Cable Creates Unit To Handle Residential Telephone Business
(Jan.
22,
2004)
available at http://www.timewamer.com/corp/newsroom/pr/
0,20812,670217,00.html.
116. The FCC added a question in its network neutrality rulemaking as to how its
Internet Policy Statement might extend to content and application providers. Preserving The
Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2009 WL 3413028, at para. 101 (F.C.C.),
October 22, 2009; and see CoMM. DAILY, Nov. 24, 2009 (2009 WLNR 24027034):
Google, unlike America's ISPs, is a company with market dominance in Internet
search and a business model that involves content management ....
To suggest
that companies operating in a highly competitive market are more able to operate
as 'gatekeepers' on the Internet, and thus more appropriate targets for government
regulation, than accompany like Google, which has clear market dominance, is to
turn logic on its head.
Id. (statement of (AT&T Sr. Exec. Vice President Jim Cicconi).
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1.

Loss of Innovation at the Physical Network Layer
The Computer Inquiry proceedings were an effort to unleash
innovation at the network layer of the telephone network circa the 1980s.
As it became clear that communications and computing would convergeindeed, it already had, inasmuch as network switches were themselves
computers at that point-a consensus
emerged that AT&T should be
7
allowed to offer enhanced services.' 1
The Internet's development was mapped out in a layer approach not
unlike the view presented in Computer Inquiry: the enhanced layer
operated above and relied upon the transmission layer. 18 In computers, a
similar layer approach is familiar. A user may use one operating system
(say, Microsoft's Windows) upon which both affiliated and unaffiliated
applications run (say Microsoft's Word but also Corel's WordPerfect). In
1978, a seven-layer "open systems interconnection" model was established
to describe hierarchies in digital environments." 9 Variations of the layering
architecture have been advanced, but, generally, there is a differentiation
among these four: the (1) physical layer, where the wired network and
modem reside; (2) the logical layer, where the protocol resides (e.g.,
TCP/IP); (3) the applications layer (e.g., World Wide Web); and (4) the
content layer (e.g., Web sites, Google).
The layers approach is helpful as a description of the Internet. It is
less helpful when it becomes a form of legal determinism, used to control
where particular providers belong as a legal matter. Participants above the
physical layer benefit if the physical layer remains a regulated input on
which others can innovate. Strict nondiscrimination at the physical layer
ensures reliability for what follows above it.
Yet, time and again, participants at one layer, free of strictures, can
move up or down and innovate; for example, Google's move into
operating-system space (Chrome) and Microsoft's assault on the search
space (Bing). Innovation that occurs because of the use of market power at
another layer is one thing; such was the complaint against Microsoft and its
Internet Explorer browser in the 1990s.1 20 But, by limiting a market

participant by regulation to occupy one layer only, innovation is stymied.

117. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 428 at para. 115 (May 2, 1980).
118. Id. at417-418.
119. It was established by the International Standards Organization. See Kevin Werbach,
A Layered Model for InternetPolicy, 1J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 37, 59 (2002).
120. The Department of Justice sued Microsoft in 1998 over Microsoft's decision to
bundle its flagship Internet Explorer (IE) Web browser software with its Windows operating
system. Bundling them was alleged to have been responsible for Microsoft's victory in
displacing Netscape as the dominant browser. The case was eventually settled in 2001. Press
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The debate over whether innovation occurs at the edge of the network
or in the network is three decades old. Edge providers---content players
like Google or Yahoo! in the Internet context-fear an unrestrained
network will foreclose their opportunities because of anticompetitive
conduct. They may also fear that the network will be configured or operate
to favor network-owned applications. As this Article will discuss in Section
V, competition laws can and should protect against anticompetitive
behavior by networks.
But there is significant loss to innovation if the layer approach
disallows those who provide the physical layer from providing services
higher up the chain. Opportunity for innovation is lost if the physical layer
can adopt only one form of operation as a nondiscriminatory common
carrier. And a dumb-pipe mantra runs counter to the innovation-rich policy
concerns of layer advocates, even while it is believed to protect innovation
of the Internet's edge.
It is one of the continuing ironies of the network neutrality debate that
some of the most vociferous advocates for government intervention are
those who claim closest proximity to the mantle of Internet freedom. Ex
ante Internet network regulation by a federal authority is really a statement
of freedom for some, not all, Internet participants. Advocating that
networks behave like rate-regulated common carriers-on which all
innovation is built by other, value-adding players-is a nice assumption to
build one kind of network. But it assumes away a lot of reality as to how
broadband got built and how the Internet can and should develop. It holds
constant a variable-the network providers-whose contributions to
Internet innovation have been quite significant. And it assumes the case for
denying further investment in certain types of innovation by this layer of
the Internet.
Consider the FCC's view in its groundbreaking enforcement action
against Comcast Corporation.' 2' There, the agency determined that a cable
operator had engaged in unreasonable network management by its
throttling of particular peer-to-peer applications (P2P) (e.g., BitTorrent) as
a way, the company claimed, of dealing with congestion. Even though the
FCC "found" that Comcast had engaged in unreasonable networkmanagement practices, it ordered Comcast to explain what it had done and
to propose another means of managing network congestion. It did not
explain what "reasonable" management would entail. But it decided
Comcast's behavior was wide of the mark. In doing so, the FCC opined
Release, Department of Justice (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/p
r/2001/November/01_at_569.htm.
121. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 3.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62

that certain network surveillance to prohibit child pornography and illegal
downloads would be permitted, but it did not address whether other types
of discrimination to rein in offensive behavior (say, defamatory or hate
speech) was permitted.
The case raises many jurisdictional and factual issues and
demonstrates what ex ante rules might look like. For the purposes of the
argument here, it is worth exploring how agency regulation may limit
network-technology development. Just as Lawrence Lessig identified 122a
privately developed software Code as capable of limiting innovation,
government regulation of networks can stifle other innovation.
2.

Impeding Innovation at Other Layers

Advocates of dumb-pipe architecture for the network assume that,
once that layer is commoditized, there will be the opportunity for
innovation. This view accepts a static picture of the Internet. It ignores the
reality that the Internet's "center of the universe" turns out to be quite a bit
evolutionary, to the consternation of owners of shares in Prodigy,
CompuServe, @Home, AOL, and Yahoo!. Each of these entities, at one
time or another, held sway as the fulcrum of the Internet. Prodigy and
CompuServe were the original "walled garden" providers. 123 @Home was a
failed consortium of cable-modem service providers. 124 AOL dominated
ISPs until dial up was replaced by broadband. And content aggregator
Yahoo! was eclipsed by search engines like Google until it too renewed its
focus on search. 125 26 Facebook and Twitter may challenge Google's
dominance in search.'
While none of these entities comprised only the "physical layer"
occupied by broadband network providers, their preeminence, at one time
or another, in the Internet's development was no less significant than the
wireline networks of today. One could imagine the claims of discrimination
122. Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS

OF CYBERSPACE

4-5 (1999).

123. See Prodigy (online services) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prodigy_(online-service)
(last visited Dec. 9, 2009) ("Despite losing subscribers, Prodigy stuck with its graphical
interface, its proprietary content, and its traditional policies while other services embraced
open standards and grew faster.").
124. See @Home Network, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/@HomeNetwork (last visited
Dec. 9, 2009).
125. Nor is Google the ne plus ultra necessarily. "It is a mistake to think of the Web
browser as the apex of the PC's evolution, especially as new peer-to-peer applications show
that PCs can be used to ease network traffic congestion and to allow people directly to
interact in new ways." JONATHAN ZITrRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How TO
STOP IT 125 (2008).
126. Associated Press, Microsoft redesigns MSN, adds Twitter, Facebook, AP PRESS,
(Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/
ALeqM5hlgabZ8VLqXi57QWhGx-SXzKOziAD9BOGLPG1.
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against each leader, during its reign. Prodigy only had buttons for its
providers. AOL charged huge fees to be a preferred subject-matter provider
on its home page. 27 Google, the dominant search engine, does not disclose
its search algorithm so that many 1businesses
that depend on its fairness can
28
verify how it operates as to them.
Government has wisely resisted examining discrimination by Edge
providers. 129 This hands-off treatment is consistent with the established
government policies favoring less regulation of the Internet. The physical
network layer may receive more attention because parts of it-those parts
of the incumbent telco networks built by revenues from rate of return
regulation-were historically regulated as carrier networks. But that legacy
does not apply to cable-modem networks, new-fiber replacements,
telephone-company networks, or, for the most part, any wireless network.
These changes in the Internet's center of gravity occurred through
technological innovation. Browsers overtook walled gardens; broadband
overtook dial up; Google overtook slower, less dynamic or reliable search
engines like AltaVista. In a fast-changing technological environment, it is
difficult to maintain that the physical layer, and it alone, must be regulated
so that actors in other parts of the Internet may have the freedom to
innovate. This view not only ignores innovation at that level; it also
assumes that participants at other layers will exert less control over the
Internet's destiny. Thus, insisting on network regulation invites scrutiny of
whatever may be the center of Internet gravity today, likely Google. But
given the FCC's spotty record regulating changing technologies, ex ante
initiatives are liable to rob the future of30 the "generative" benefits that
providers at all levels bring to the Internet.1
V. THE OLD AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FCC
Critics of the FCC, both within and without, have been around almost
as long as the agency itself. One irate commissioner in the 1960s described
127. In one famous contract revealing the excesses of the Internet bubble, DrKoop.com
paid $89 million to be the preferred health provider for AOL customers. Todd Woody, The
Drkoop.com Deathwatch, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 5, 2000, available at

http://www.thestandard.com/article/0, 1902,14615,00.html.
128. The algorithm is patented. Google's Web site states: "We use more than 200
signals, including our patented PageRankT algorithm, to examine the entire link structure
of the web and determine which pages are most important." Corporate Information:
Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html (last visited Dec. 9,
2009).
129. See Vishesh Kumar & Christopher Rhoads, Google Wants Its Own Fast Track on
the Web, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122929270127905065.html. Google was reportedly seeking a "fast lane for its own
content" from cable and telephone companies. Id.
130. See JONATHAN ZITTRAiN, supra note 125, at 179-80.
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an FCC Bureau as worse than a pig pen.' Another authored a treatise on
how the public interest could be met only by citizens awakening the FCC to
new action.' 32 Some members of the current FCC, apparently dissatisfied
with the sufficiency of notice-and-comment filings common to
administrative process, hit the road to conduct "field hearings" where
citizens could speak directly for a few minutes on issues of broadcast
diversity. 133 And Congress recently undertook oversight of the FCC's
management processes, 34 resulting in a majority
House committee report
135
highly critical of the agency's management.
When it comes to possessing and maintaining the expertise to regulate
networks, the FCC suffers from two main shortcomings: (1) an adequate
knowledge base on the staff for making decisions and (2) an adequate level
of expertise on the part of the voting members. The result is an
environment that can result in the wildly off-the-mark results like the
FCC's video dialtone regime or a wrong call in regard to how a network
should be regulated. To develop this theme, it is useful to examine the
strengths and weaknesses of the agency.
A.

The Internal and ExternalFCC Resources

1.

The Agency's Ability to Understand Networks

The FCC, each year, processes applications to provide service,
decides how rules should apply to particular circumstances, resolves
disputes among parties, and commences and completes rulemakings and
studies. These decisions easily reach annually into the thousands. 3 6 While
131. Edith Efron, He Has Seen Pig Pens Better Run, TV GUIDE, July 3, 1965, at 15, 16
(statement of FCC Commissioner Lee Loevinger, named by President Kennedy as
replacement to Newton Minow) ("I've seen pig pens better run than the [FCC] Broadcast
Bureau!") (emphasis in original).
132. NICHOLAS JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YOuR TELEVISION SET (1970).
133. The FCC held six public hearings on media ownership in geographically diverse
locations around the country in 2007-08. See Public Hearings on Media Ownership Issues,
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/hearings.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
134. See John Eggerton, House Launches FCCInvestigation; Warns Against Destroying
Documents, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/
article/CA6518202.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
135. House Commerce Comm., Majority Staff, Deception andDistrust: The FCC Under
Chairman Kevin Martin (Dec. 2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
images/stories/Documents/PDF/Newsroom/fcc%20majority/o2Ostaft0 /o2Oreport%2008 1209.
pdf.
136. One way to measure the FCC's annual output is to follow the number of individual
documents issued by each Bureau and the FCC as a whole. For 2007, there were a total of
8,223 released documents by the whole agency and 1,850 documents released by the Media
Bureau alone. These tabulations are made by using the FCC's EDOCS Search engine and
populating the date fields with the entire year, EDOCS Advance Search,
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more routine matters are handled on delegated authority, the FCC
commissioners themselves review and vote on hundreds of decisions.
For many routine licensing matters involving radio frequencies, the
FCC possesses sufficient engineering expertise. Through its own
laboratories 137 and field studies, it can review claims of interference or
conduct measurements of its own. Even with the objectivity of actual or
predicted interference measurements, the policies that get made based on
those measurements are not uniformly the stuff of white-coated
expertise. 138 And, in 2008, the FCC abnegated its own satellite-radio
licensing policies, which had mandated two separate companies, not one,
when it allowed the Sirius-XM combination. This decision reflects the
subjectivity that affects spectrum policy decision.
When analyzing networks, the FCC's expertise depends on both a
starting-point knowledge of the network involved and an updated view
accounting for changes. For broadband networks, these requirements make
it difficult to defer to FCC expertise. For one, the initial knowledge of a
network-whether the public-switched telephone network or a cable
network--depends, to a significant degree, on the willingness and ability of
the network to reveal itself in ways pertinent to the regulator's
understanding. There is little reason for network operators to be too overt
with the regulator. Robust openness with government regulators, at any
level, is hardly the norm for most enterprises.
A regulated industry may have nothing to hide. But it may not be too
anxious for the regulator to know its business architecture, unless that
knowledge serves to further a business advantage or must be disclosed for
safety or health reasons. In addition, network architecture and procedures
are a form of trade secret that, once revealed to the regulator, run the risk of
falling into the hands of competitors.

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/edocsLink.do?mode=advance&type=n
(last visited
Dec. 9, 2009).
137. The FCC maintains a testing laboratory in Columbia, Maryland. See Federal
Communications Commission, Equipment Authorization, http://www.fcc.gov/oet/ea/ (last
visited Dec. 9, 2009) (describing laboratory activity).
138. For instance, in analyzing interference from unregulated devices in so-called white
spaces (i.e., spaces unoccupied by broadcast signals), there was little dispute about the
accuracy of the FCC's measurements, although there was considerable controversy over
what policy conclusions to draw from the interference levels. See Unlicensed Operation in
the TV Broadcast Bands, Second Report and Orderand Memorandum Opinion and Order,
23 F.C.C.R. 16807 (2008). In addition, the FCC simply failed to consider the studies before
declaring that interference from broadband-over-power lines would not interfere with ham
radio operator transmissions. See Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir.
2008). Even there, however, the court allowed the FCC's interference rules to continue
while the case was remanded to the agency. Id.
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Furthermore, the network can change, and frequently does, as in the
case of emerging broadband networks, where upload and download speeds
have dramatically increased in the space of a few years. Switching out and
upgrading network gear is commonplace on modem networks. 139 Updating
the FCC on every such equipment switch would be costly and might inhibit
140
desirable network improvements.
The agency could also obtain needed expertise by hiring professionals
from the regulated industries who could share their knowledge of network
practices, subject to the limitations of past assurances of confidentiality to
former employers. As a practical matter, the FCC's revolving door sees an
exodus of experts from the government to industry (or elsewhere),
generally not the reverse. 14 1 And, even when industry professionals are
recruited, their knowledge of network practices in a fast-moving area, like
broadband, ages quickly. Left to gain an understanding of network
developments from reports in the trade press or from carefully drafted
industry submissions, the staff seldom possesses a level of expertise
comparable to other areas, where its own laboratory can recreate field
conditions and reproduce results of sufficient scientific reliability. The
FCC's 2009 roundtables, used to develop a record for its national
broadband policy statement, was an effort to bridge this inevitable gap. 142
And, when a process is so dependent on outside industry for an
accurate picture, a form of industry capture can develop. 43 Capture can
lead either to capitulating to the industry's formulation (as was often the
case during the monopoly AT&T days) or ignoring what industry has
presented out of fear of an incomplete picture (lacking the means or desire
to complete it).

139. See, e.g., WALTER CICIORA ET AL., MODERN CABLE TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY 28-29
(1999) (discussing introduction of digital-video compression into cable plant).
140. For example, the Comcast response to the FCC's Order to provide a new networkmanagement plan ran nineteen pages and included detailed specifications of equipment from
three different vendors. See Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs, Comcast Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission
(Sept.
19,
2009)
available
at
http://nallfoss.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orjpdf=pdf&iddocument=6520169715.
141. See generally MARK GREEN, SELLING OUT (2002).
142. The nearly two dozen workshops sought a wide variety of speakers and greater
public participation. A Web site was established to reach all interested parties. See
Broadband.gov, Workshops, http://www.broadband.gov/workshops.html (last visited Dec.
9, 2009).
143. Industry capture theory developed to explain how regulators become so reliant on
information provided by the industry itself, or become corrupted because of excessive
contact, improper gifts, or excessive reliance on interested parties. See George Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). See also Jean-Jacques Laffont &

Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture,
106 Q. J. ECON 1089 (1991).
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This characterization is by no means a denigration of the integrity of
the FCC staff or of their efforts. They are not unlike most scholars trying to
critique network regulation; we all must rely on an observer's
understanding of the technology.
But administrative law assumes deference to a regulatory agency
because of a supposed expertise and sustains judgments made on that
144
expertise in interpreting its own rules or ambiguous statutory mandates.
Where the staff has neither worked in nor designed a network, judgments
about how best to operate should be approached with regulatory humility
and reviewed with a degree of skepticism, not strong deference.
2.

The Commissioners' Own Expertise

The FCC has grown in importance because the industries over which
it exercises jurisdiction-explicit, implied, or presumed-have loomed
larger in the U.S. economy. The nation moved to a services and
information economy. Interet-related industry has become an
indispensable part of much of modem life. Minutes of telephone usage
continue to increase (even while much of the traffic is transferred from
wireline to wireless). 145 Despite the growth of the Internet for recreational
uses, household television viewing has not significantly ebbed. 146 And we
are at the threshold of mobile broadband use, which will combine the musthave wireless device with the must-have content of the Internet.
The FCC lies at the intersection of these social and business trends.
An understanding of physical and electrical engineering principles would
seem to be a much-needed qualification. A facility with economics and an
ability to invoke economic theory in shaping policy would seem, too, to be
a must for such a deliberative body. The ability to understand and apply the
nation's communications laws would also be critical. And, when it comes
to understanding the effect of regulation on networks,
the combination of
147
engineering and economics appears indispensable.
144. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
145. FCC Wireline Competition Bureau, Industry Analysis and Technology Division,
Trends
in
Telephone
Service
11-6
(2008),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-284932AI .pdf.
146. "Nielsen's findings show that screen time of the average American continues to
increase with TV users watching more TV than ever before (127 hrs, 15 min per month),
while also spending 9% more time using the Internet (26 hrs, 26 min per month) from last
year." News Release, The Nielsen Company, Nielsen Reports TV, Internet and Mobile
Usage Among Americans (July 8, 2008), http://en-us.nielsen.com/main/news/news_
releases/2008/july/nielsenreports-tv (to download, click on PDF under "Related Links").
147. The problem of sufficient agency expertise is not confined to the FCC. The Food
and Drug Administration has been criticized as being unable to "fulfill its mission because
its scientific base has eroded and its scientific organizational structure is weak."
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 3
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Surprisingly, since 1960, the FCC has never had an experienced
engineer, scientist, or technologist as a commissioner. Only one trained,
Ph.D. economist has served on the FCC. Lawyers have been appointed to
the FCC but, in the last thirty years, few have been versed in federal
communications law. 148 Instead, like many presidential appointments, the
chief qualification of the incumbents to these positions has often been a
connection to an influential senator or congressman or to the administration
(up to and including the president, who, in addition to nominating proposed
commissioners, designates the one who will serve as chair). For an expert
agency, there is no vetting as is
done by the American Bar Association for
49
federal judicial appointments. 1
Appointments to the FCC do not appear to have the qualificationladen attributes of many, though certainly not all, who serve on the
Securities and Exchange Commission or the FTC. As noted, although there
are radio-spectrum issues that arise, the science may go one way, the policy
another. And issues of broadcasting, cable, and the Internet, or matters like
universal-service funding, are not decided on the procedural or liabilityassignment policies of securities law or economic analysis of FTC
Competition Bureau matters. Generalists can, and do, get appointed; wellconnected Hill staffers have been frequent appointees for this reason.
And even the most qualified will face the competing pressures of
having to answer to both the president and Congress, leading to constraints
on the flexibility of agencies to develop policies that do not comply with
one branch or another. In addition, because all commissioners are named
by the president,150Congress will build in protections against undue White
House influence.

(2007),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/20074329b 02 01 FDA%2OReport%20on%2OScience%20and%20Technology.pdf. See also
Terry Carter, The Pre-emptionPrescription,A.B.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 42, 46.
148. Of the twenty-nine commissioners who have served on the FCC since 1980, twentytwo were lawyers, three were nonlawyer government employees, one was an economist, one
served in industry (as a local broadcast executive), and one had a bachelor's degree in
engineering but served as a lawyer in government. See Federal Communications
Commission,
Previous FCC Commissioners,
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/
previouscommish.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). And see FCC Comm'r Robert McDowell,
"Questions To Ask Regarding Internet Regulation", Nov. 12, 2009, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-294631AI .pdf ("I have the highest
regard for each of my four colleagues on the Commission, but not one of us is an engineer.
Do you really want us making these highly technical decisions?").
149. See Terry Carter, Do-Over: After an Eight-year Pause, the ABA Is Again Vetting
Possible
Federal
Bench
Nominee
(May
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/do-over/.
150. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 435 (1989).
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Expert arguments-by economic or engineering consultants-are
frequently filed at the FCC. But the process is increasingly more open to
the layperson. Consider change in the way interested parties comment on
proposed rules or other matters. Much is to the good. Gone are the days of
complicated filing and service requirements if one wanted to file an
informal comment in an FCC rulemaking proceeding. Anyone can file
comments via the Internet, and even formal comments are expected to be
filed electronically. 151 Ten years ago, the only way to review what was filed
in a proceeding was to visit the file room of the agency in person and
review papers in the docket. This is no longer the case; parties can retrieve
all filings in a docket online, including formal comments and studies,
informal comments, and after-comment period ex parte filings.
The result is a far more open process. But because of its openness, the
process takes on aspects of a legislative, rather than an administrative,
proceeding. The FCC has conducted legislative-type hearings, akin to a
city-council hearing, where panels present and citizens get the opportunity
to present short speeches. 15 2 Partisans on one side of a controversial issue
are urged to e-file with the FCC. In the pre-Intemet days, these calls to
action meant hundreds of thousands of postcards directed at the FCC. One
years-long campaign was directed at a nonexistent petition supposedly filed
by atheist Madeline Murray O'Hare to prohibit radio licenses to religious
entities.' 53 Another postcard campaign arose in the early 1980s to register
opposition to an announcement that the ABC Television network
5 4 was
going to air a romantic comedy about two men, "Adam and Yves."'
These postcard campaigns led to no FCC decisions and may have
been designed as much by their promoters as straw man, fund-raising tools
than as a way to register citizen reaction with federal authorities. But the
campaigns could not be ignored by the FCC; millions were watching what
it did (or did not do).
151. See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Electronic Comment Filing
System, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
152. Broadcast localism hearings are reviewed on the FCC Web site at fcc.gov/localism.
See Memorandum Opinion and Order,54 F.C.C.2d 941,
153. Multiple Ownership et al.,
941-42 (1975). See also FCC, Excerpts from Multiple Ownership et al., available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ftp/Bureaus/MassMedia/Databases/documentscollection/75-946.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009), which states the following:
The rumor that the FCC has before it a proposal to not issue licenses to religious
broadcasters still continues to circulate, more than 30 years after the Commission
denied that request. The FCC's policy toward religious broadcasters remains
unchanged in that no special provisions or restrictions are applied to religious
stations or licensees, nor are any changes to that policy contemplated.
Id.
154. This is my recollection while serving as legal advisor to the FCC chair in the early
1980s. The source was a proposed story idea that ran in some newspapers, leading to a
backlash from anti-gay groups.
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The e-filings of the twenty-first century possess a similar populist
ring. They present a version of "reverse regulatory capture." Instead of the
agency decision makers being limited in their knowledge base by the
control of industry lobbying, they can be influenced by the ability of
populist or corporate movements to rally the base.' Fact-based analysis
gets replaced by political-campaign-style practices. 116 FCC members are
increasingly comfortable with the legislative process, and the exercise of
expert judgment morphs into a plebiscite. This possibility was1 7 predicted by
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast a decade before the e-filing.1
Those filing in this manner can exert additional influence because a
vote "against" a large citizen constituency can also lead to creating public
opposition to reappointment. Initial or reappointment confirmation, even
after full vetting by an administration, has proved difficult in the last
twenty years, even when qualifications have nothing to do with the
delay. 58 Issues like network neutrality have generated a political force with
which commissioners desirous of reappointment must reckon.

155. In the campaign to obtain rules for unlicensed devices in the broadcasting "White
Spaces," Google pointed to over 20,000 comments in favor of such licensing that had been
filed in the FCC docket examining the proposal, Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast
Bands, Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R.
16807, 16903 (2008): "And, thanks to the more than 20,000 of you who took a stand on this
issue through our Free the Airwaves campaign, the FCC heard a clear message from
consumers: these airwaves can bring wireless Internet to everyone everywhere." Posting of
Larry Page to The Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/1 i/vote-forbroadband-in-white-spaces.html (Nov. 4, 2008, 14:46 PST).
156. Mathew Lasar, Interview: Laying it on the line with FCC ChairKevin Martin, ARS
TECHNICA,
Oct. 6 2008, http://arstechnica.com/articles/culture/fcc-interview-kevinmartin.ars/2. Lasar wrote the following:
The post-Dot Bomb Internet fueled and propelled this experience through the
Bush years. Blogs, social networks, and most importantly, on-line [sic] Web
forums became a kind of organic extension of the FCC's Web site, www.fcc.gov,
allowing groups to deluge the agency with hitherto untold numbers of comments,
complaints, petitions, and filings. Access to the Commission's online database of
filings also allowed an army of nobodies (like me) to become instant
commentators on the agency's internal doings. Id.
157. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 150, at 440-41:
An agency that has sufficient resources to generate its own information about the
consequences of its decisions, available funds to subsidize the participation in its
processes of various poorly organized interests, and a relatively lenient standard
for judicial review of its actions (for example, arbitrary and capricious), will be far
less dependent on highly organized, well-represented interests than an agency that
lacks resources and faces a high standard for upholding its decisions in court.
158. See Ted Hearn, Politics Hold Up Ness Reappointment, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar.
27, 2000, at 38, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articleslmi-hb4895/is_200003/ai_
n17985431.
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B.

The PoliticalEconomy of the FCC
When broadcasting was more dominant, the FCC's role in
administering Section 315,159 the "equal opportunity" rules for political
candidates, could be critical. The FCC can decide when a candidate is
entitled to demand equal time to match the conditions of an opponent's
appearance (or "use" of a broadcaster's station). It determines when a talk
show is deemed to be an exempt news-interview program. For a president
seeking re-election, whose decision led to the commissioner's nomination,
the outcome of these decisions can be significant. Even with broadcast
television's declining viewing audience, the FCC's administration of
Section 315 still matters.
While there are no documented cases of overt influence, several FCC
chairmen were appointed following active involvement in a presidential
campaign. 160 There is no harm in that. But, other than those in the Federal
Election Commission, few agency appointments are as tied to the political
future of those who help to obtain an appointment. And, even if not
impacted by the President,
Congress carries near-constant oversight of the
161
agency's business.

The assumption that the FCC is an expert body could be replaced by
one that frankly assumes it is a legislative one. Many state public-utility
commissioners must stand for election. But those agencies have
traditionally regulated utilities-water, telephone, or electric-whose plant
has been financed by guaranteed rates of return on invested capital.
Networks, like cable or wireless broadband networks, were not created
under that model and have not been subject to such political influences.
And it is by no means evident that a legislative-focused FCC would be a
move in the right direction where technical, network-management
questions are concerned.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2009).
160. Newton Minow (1961-1963) worked on John Kennedy's campaign. See Museum of
Brdcst.
Comm.,
Minow, Newton, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/htmlM/
minownewton/minownewton.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). Kevin Martin (2003-2008) was
Deputy General Counsel of the George W. Bush campaign (2000). See FCC, Former FCC
Chairman
Kevin
J.
Martin,
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/
previous/martin/biography.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). The current Chair, Julius
Genachowski, was law school classmate of Barack Obama and is credited with developing
his campaign's Internet strategy. See FCC Commissioner Juilius Genachowski: Obama
Selects
Former
Harvard
Classmate,
Posting
to
the
Huffington
Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/12/fcc-commissioner-julius-gn_l 57350.html
(Feb. 12, 2009, 5:12 AM).
161. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) ("The

independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often
been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply
been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.").
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VI. THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO Ex ANTE NETWORK
REGULATION
So far, this Article has tried to demonstrate that prescriptive
broadband regulation by the FCC lacks the elements for success. Success
presupposes the following: a proved record of managing similar regulatory
challenges, a subject matter that can lend itself to reasonable inquiry to
arrive at sensible and predictable outcomes, providers that have the
reasonable expectation of regulation of their networks, and an agency
competence adequate to the task. In each phase of the model, the FCC's
profile is unavailing. The result is a low expectation of success in the
endeavor.
But there are issues arising in broadband management that demand
some resolution short of government intervention. In this Section, the scope
of the regulatory problems and alternatives to resorting to the FCC for
resolving disputes will be examined. In particular, this Article advocates
greater reliance on the community culture of the Internet and the use of
ever-increasing levels of network disclosure, on which liability for
inaccuracies can be based.
A. The Problem ofDefining the Problem: Ex Ante Regulation and
the Use of a Legal Standard
There is no agreed-upon definition of "network neutrality." One
attempt at a neutral definition of the term defines it in three parts: a
broadband service provider (1) charges the consumer only once for Internet
access, (2) declines to favor one content provider over another, and (3)
does not charge content providers for sending information over broadband
lines to end users. 162 Most advocates would allow price tiering of speeds of
services so that a network provider could charge more for faster
throughputs (i.e., 1 Kilobits per second (Kps) pays less than 3 Kps).
Beyond that, little consensus exists.
In the Comcast complaint, the FCC cited its previously determined
(but not generally enforceable) policy statement 163 as applicable law.' 64
162. Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics ofNet Neutrality,THE EcoNoMIsTs'
VOICE, June 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss6/art8/ (click "Download"). Another

definition would invoke the four Internet freedoms, which were first articulated in a speech
by one FCC chairman, then adopted by another as an enforceable policy, and used against
Comcast. See generally Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network
Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 644, 657 (2007)
(discussing briefly the four freedoms).
163. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facil.,
PolicyStatement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].
164. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 3, at para. 13.
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That policy, drawing from an earlier articulation of four "Internet
freedoms" in a speech by one FCC chairman, 165 guarantees that individuals
may access anyone or any content, use any application, and attach any
device. 66 It also included a provision for "reasonable" network
management. Comcast was found to deny access to throttled content, and
this throttling was not saved as reasonable network management.
Enforcing some or all of these provisions has been lauded 67 and
criticized. For instance, Scott Hemphill has convincingly demonstrated that
allowing network providers to charge content providers for enhanced68
service (so-called extraction) has considerable procompetitive benefits,
even though such arrangements would raise major concerns for some
advocates, including leading content providers, like Google and
Amazon.com. These companies currently do not pay for enhanced QoS and
their dominance gives them an advantage today that could be undercut by a
smaller competitor who could use a broadband network's priority service to
differentiate its product. Some unaffiliated content providers may wish to
buy QoS from the broadband provider and bundle that additional cost into
its retail price. HDNet, which has an online high-definition169 television
service, has argued that it needs that priority to offer its service.
A version of this non-neutrality has been available at locations other
than those served by end-user providers. Business enterprises and video
Web sites sign "service level agreements" with Internet backbone providers
or content delivery server networks (like Akamai) to obtain some assurance
against network congestion to produce faster content delivery. 170 And
Google has reportedly nonexclusive arrangements to collocate its services
within the premises
of ISPs (so-called edge caching), thereby improving
7
page-load times.'
165. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the University of Colorado School
of Law Silicon Flatirons Symposium on "The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a
Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age" 5 (Feb. 8, 2004) (as prepared for delivery),
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556AI .pdf.
166. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 163, at paras. 4-5 n.15.
167. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 7.
168. C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price
Regulation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 164-76 (2008).
169. See R. Michael Senkowski, et al., Net Neutrality Primer, CYBERSPACE LAWYER,
July 2006, at 1, 3, availableat http://www.wrf.com/docs/publications/12598.pdf
170. See Jon Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate - A White
Paper,
1
INT'L
J.
COMM.
567,
572
(2007),
available
at
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/159/84 (discussing ISP guarantees of
performance);
see
also
Posting
of
George
Ou
to
ZDNet.com,
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=512 (June 4, 2007, 5:40) (discussing QoS pack prioritization
for business customers).
171. Op-Ed., Congress Should Preserve Net Neutrality, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 2008, at
B6,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=-/c/a/2008/12/17/
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Other practices are more likely to be a problem even to observers
without an economic stake. One is the exclusion of content providers from
access to the provider's network, particularly where the exclusion is based
on the unrelated provider offering a service or application that competes
with one vertically integrated into the network. 172 Another such practice is
providing QoS to some content sites and adding to that service the
commitment to deny QoS to all others in that content provider's category
(i.e., exclusive QoS). The solution for neutrality advocates would be
categorical rules forbidding, ex ante, some or all of these practices.
However, as sinister as such practices might appear, there may be
benefits to each of these practices to justify them as procompetitive. For
instance, consider the "pay twice" extraction for access (once by the
subscriber, once by the content site) for what today is paid for exclusively
and directly by the end user. Put aside the expenditures that a content
provider might already be paying upstream to a backbone provider or a
server network. Payments by content providers to broadband networks may
help defray the cost of improvements to the broadband provider's
infrastructure that is otherwise solely borne by end users, who must pay
ever-increasing fees. Lower broadband subscriber fees might increase the
adoption rate for the service, which is a national policy objective. Ruling
out such a model on a categorical basis would make little sense.
Or consider the even more potentially exclusionary arrangement
where the broadband network provider blocks some applications to favor
others with whom a financial arrangement has been made. This situation
could raise anticompetitive concerns for a broadband provider, a telephone
company, or cable operator. Would the same be said for an upstart wireless
provider, for whom such arrangements might be the only realistic way of
generating investment in its third-entry network?' 73
Categorical rules do apply to the Internet. Enforceable by the FCC or
not, viruses, phishing, and cybercrimes can be banned outright. And
network blocking is the antithesis of the Internet and is likely always
forbidden by a dominant ISP. But nearly any other practice undertaken by a
network broadband provider should at least be given the opportunity for its

ED4414PASG.DTL. The revelation of this arrangement led to a renewed argument over
what constitutes "network neutrality," given Google's leadership as a neutrality advocate.
172. See Hemphill, supra note 168, at 155-57 (discussing refusal of broadband provider
who offers voice service denying service to Vonage, an over-the-top provider).
173. Clearwire, a newcomer wireless provider in Canada, reportedly had such an
arrangement with Bell Canada. See Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way on
Network Neutrality, THE NEW ATLANTIs, Summer 2006, at 47, 58, available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/a-third-way-on-network-neutrality.
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procompetitive possibilities to be considered.174 A categorical prohibition
of any non-neutral network conduct denies the possibility of society
obtaining the benefits of network innovation. 75 As the former FTC Chair
indicated, a one-size-fits-all business model may adversely affect consumer
welfare. 176 The FCC has rejected the dumb-pipe theory of network since it
recognized that networks could provide enhanced services alongside basic
transmission services in the ComputerInquiries,discussed above.
As Philip Weiser, 177 Howard Shelanski, 178 and others have argued, a
legal standard against which conduct would be evaluated by the FCC is
therefore strongly preferable to ex ante categorical rules. But, even here,
one faces the challenge of devising the exact right set of words to formulate
a general rule that would allow for after-the-fact enforcement. Drafters
must be quite careful to avoid government second guessing in the guise of
enforcing a statute. The indefiniteness of "public interest" in broadcasting
has led to varying standards. The FCC established one horizontal limit on
broadcast ownership 179 only to have Congress lower it months later. It
deemed broadcast network ownership of television shows0 verboten and
then entirely reversed its view in the "fin-syn" proceedings.18
In the context of network neutrality, some participants in the debates
would use "unreasonable discrimination" as the touchstone of what is
prohibited.1 8' Broad language would develop from this case law. But this
174. Hemphill, supra note 168, at 152 ("Condemnations of access provider
'discrimination' do not carefully distinguish practices that set different prices for different
content types-a garden-variety extraction strategy of price discrimination-from practices
that disfavor one content provider relative to its rival.") (internal citations omitted).
175. "No market participant knows the best option for creating and delivering economic
value, so it is in society's interest to have both broadband carriers and others conduct
directed economic experiments." Shane Greenstein, Economic Experiments and Neutrality
in Internet Access 42 (Nat'l Bur. Of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13158, 2007),
availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3158.
176. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chair, FTC, Keynote Address at the Federal
Communication Bar Association, Annual Meeting: The FTC: Working for Consumers in the
On-Line
World
14
(June
27,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070627fcba.pdf.
177. Philip Weiser, The Next Frontierfor Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273,
322 (2008).
178. Howard Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions than
Answers, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 39 (2007) (although he suggests the
possibility of modest ex ante regulations without identifying them).
179. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules et al., Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 18503, paras. 98-101
(2002).
180. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (c) (2004)). See Tamber Christian, The Financial Interest
And Syndication Rules - Take Two, 3 CoMM. L. CONSPECTUS 107 (1995).
181. Public Knowledge, a leading network neutrality advocate, calls for
nondiscrimination: "Public Knowledge supports a neutral Internet where network operators
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standard may prove to be, like the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity," so general that it means nothing at all and amounts to simply
stating a political conclusion that can be invoked by the FCC.'8 2 The risk in
using such a standard is that it leaves the decision process to the FCC-a
less-than-desirable outcome given the shortcomings associated with agency
understanding of evolving networks detailed in Section II. The FCC's
request that Comcast fully explain what it had done after it found that
Comcast had violated its policies suggests that the FCC was itself aware of
its own uncertainty of how Comcast had managed its network.18 3 This was
an inauspicious start for those seeking a case-law approach to deciding
unlawful discrimination. Add to this the delay and likelihood
of uncertainty
18 4
as decisions of this sort run through the appellate process.
We next explore whether there are alternatives to FCC policymaking
that might yield a better system of deciding network management
may offer different levels of access at higher rates as long as that tier is offered on a
nondiscriminatory basis to every other provider." Public Knowledge, Network Neutrality,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/network-neutrality (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). The
NTIA's Broadband Technology Opportunities Program requires entities awarded funds to
adhere to "nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations" to be established by
NTIA. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 60010). The FCC's network
neutrality notice also provides for "nondiscrimination" as a fifth FCC principle of Internet
freedom. Preserving The Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2009 WL
3413028, para. 103 (F.C.C.), October 22, 2009. Just before the FCC's proposal was issued,
leaders of Verizon and Google, who have differed on the need for network neutrality, agreed
on a joint statement. In that version, the two companies described "nondiscrimination" in
greater detail:
Fifth, broadband network providers should have the flexibility to manage
their networks to deal with issues like traffic congestion, sparn,
"malware" and denial of service attacks, as well as other threats that
may emerge in the future--so long as they do it reasonably, consistent
with their customers' preferences, and don't unreasonably discriminate
in ways that either harm users or are anti-competitive.
Posting
of
Eric
Schmidt
to
Google
Public
Policy
Blog,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/1 0/finding-common-ground-on-openintemet.html (Oct. 21, 2009, 18:16 EST).
182. In Mistretta v. United States, Justice Scalia stated that it is difficult to imagine any
standard "too vague to survive judicial scrutiny" given that the public interest standard has
been upheld. 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing NBC, Inc. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943)). See generally Randolph J. May, The Public Interest
Standard: Is It too Indeterminateto Be Constitutional?53 FED. CoMM. L.J. 427 (2001).
183. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supranote 3, at para. 54.
184. Several of the apparently victorious parties appealed the Comcast decision, even
though Comcast itself agreed to comply with the requirements that it revise its policy and
report on what it believed occurred. See Petition for Review, Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. FCC, No. 08-4269 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2008); Petition for Review,
Pennsylvania PIRG v. FCC, No. 08-3676 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2008); Petition for Review,
Vuze, Inc. v. FCC, No. 08-73768 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2008). Comcast and other cable
operators also appealed. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 4, 2008).
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questions, in particular reliance on Internet community values and a
disclosure/contract model.
Other approaches have been considered elsewhere, and are worth
brief mention, namely use of antitrust lawsuits and self-regulatory
organizations.
B.

Antitrust Law

Disputes over the behavior of a broadband network provider by
application providers would stem from the perceived monopoly or duopoly
status of providers. Even if there are some competitive choices among
networks, it is not as if the consumer can switch between providers easily
in response to a new policy, especially if there are only two providers and
both follow the same policy. Indeed, price and quality competition will
likely trump competitive network policy offers. Anticompetitive conductsay, for example, outright blocking-presents a harm to consumers which
may not remedied by a sufficiently competitive marketplace. This concern
could be reached by antitrust enforcement.
But how good a fit are the laws here? Antitrust analysis starts with a
definition of a market and harm to consumers, not to intermediate
dependent producers. It is hard to see how competition is substantially
lessened by practices that would, say, charge one online bookseller more
than another, or even blocking a rival's application if the network had its
own application.' 8 5 In the bricks-and-mortar world, retailers engage in these
practices.1 86 The market for broadband service may be even more
competitive as a result.
Antitrust enforcement law might be a better fit in the case of the
broadband network provider who creates a tying arrangement with its ISP
service and a complementary product and requires the consumer to buy the
tied product as a condition of ISP service. For example, suppose a
broadband provider bundles a streaming movie service with its ISP service.
(Such an arrangement is akin to Microsoft's operating system being
bundled with its application software suite.) 8 7 The argument is that other
sellers of movie content will be disadvantaged by the arrangement. But it is
hard to see how consumers are always necessarily hurt. If consumers do not
185. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Address at the Broadband Policy Summit IV:
Broadband Access Policy: The Role of Antitrust 6 (June 13, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080613broadbandaccess.pdf (stating that the FTC
Commissioner was not confident that antitrust courts would find blocking a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
186. Wal-Mart may sell only certain brands. IKEA mostly sells its own branded
merchandise.
187. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22864 (D.D.C. Nov. 12,
2002).
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value the ISP service at the price offered for the bundle, they will not buy
it. The tied movie service amounts to a "free" service if it has no value to
the customer. Application providers may not like the pressure the
broadband network can apply-that is, after all, one of the reasons for the
network neutrality advocacy by the applications community.
So, antitrust law may be a "good way"' 8 8 to think about the problem,
but its ability to provide a predictable, timely remedy may be of limited
use. Even if antitrust law is ultimately applied, as FTC Commissioner
Jonathan Leibowitz notes, it may be too little, too late.' 89 The length and
expense of leading antitrust cases supports that viewpoint.
There is another problem: the U.S. Supreme Court's Trinko'90
decision declined to allow antitrust law to remedy the situation where a
monopolist refuses to help rivals compete with it, either under the
"essential facilities" or any other doctrine. The Court reasoned that
application of antitrust laws would "lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in . . . economically beneficial facilities."' 9
While the case involved the question of the overlap between antitrust and
claims under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the Court raised the bar
for demonstrating under antitrust law 1 that
discriminatory network conduct
92
effects.
anticompetitive
had
invariably
It is hard to predict what a court would do with antitrust claims by
applications that are excluded or otherwise discriminated against by a
network broadband provider. Just as communications policy is struggling
to deal with objections of the type raised in the Comcast case, so courts
may fashion a standard for claims more forgiving than Trinko.' 93
But it is by no means clear that antitrust law will be a satisfactory
remedy for determining whether a network broadband provider's practice is
188. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC, Concurring Statement Regarding the Staff Report:
"Broadband Connectivity, Competition Policy" 1 (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V07000statement.pdf.
189. Id. at 3. ("[Tlhere is little agreement over whether antitrust, with its requirements
for ex post case by case analysis, is capable of fully and in a timely fashion resolving many
of the concerns that have animated the net neutrality debate.").
190. Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
191. Id.at408.
192. Id.
193. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An
InstitutionalPerspective on the Net Neutrality Debate iii (Reg-Markets Ctr., Working Paper

No.

08-07),

available

at

http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-

safely.php?fniame=../pdffiles/phpGw.pdf. Tom Hazlett has also endorsed an antitrust
approach. Thomas Hazlett, FCC Should Leave Net Neutrality to Anti-Trust Courts,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bac78ca4-8ee8-1 ldd-946c-0000779fdl 8c.html. But see James
V. DeLong, Avoiding a Tech Train Wreck, The Am., and May/June 2008, available at
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/may-june-magazine-contents/avoiding-a-tech-trainwreck (describing the application of antitrust law to network neutrality as "fairly useless").
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unlawful. The likelihood that a complained-of activity has sufficient
procompetitive effects is significant. And the cost and duration of solving
issues by means of government or private antitrust lawsuits raise their own
significant limitations to this remedy.
C.

Standards-Settingand Self-Regulatory Organizations

Much of the formative work in developing Internet policies in the
1990s arose through voluntary and quite inclusive organizations, like
ICANN,' 94 and inclusive but more qualification-heavy groups, such as The
Internet Society' 95 and its two organizations, the Internet Engineering Task
Force 96 and the Internet Architecture Board. 97 ICANN played its most
significant card (so far) in establishing the system of domain names and
methods for domain registration. The latter organizations identify best
practices through ongoing forums that require some degree of technical
prowess and
an understanding of the developments that have already
98
occurred.

1

Technical standards of the Internet backbone-at least since the
National Science Foundation released government control over its structure
and function in the 1990s' 9 -have been the result of voluntary agreements
194. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a nonprofit
corporation that works with the Department of Commerce to manage and monitor Internet
activity and functionality. The primary functions of ICANN are to manage the assignment
of domain names and IP addresses, help preserve the operational stability of the Internet,
achieve broad representation of the global Internet community, and develop policies
appropriate to its mission through bottom-up, consensus-based processes. Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, http://www.icann.org/ (last visited Dec. 10,
2009).
195. The Internet Society (ISOC) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1992 to provide
leadership in Internet related standards, education, and policy. Internet Society (ISOC):
Introduction to ISOC, http://www.isoc.org/isoc/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
196. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a voluntary, open-standards
organization funded by various sponsors including the National Security Agency. IETF
works to develop and promote Internet standards with particular regard to TCP/IP and
Internet Protocol suite. Internet Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2010).
197. The Internet Architecture Board (lAB) is the committee of the Internet Society
(ISOC) charged with oversight of the technical and engineering development of the Internet.
It oversees a number of task forces including IETF, providing architectural oversight,
standards process oversight and appeals, and serves as the external liaison to organizations
concerned with standards and other technical and organizational issues relevant to the
Internet. Internet Architecture Board, http://www.iab.org/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
198. These groups exhibit Douglass North's characterization that "[t]ypically they
economize on information, so, for example, players need no longer know the entire past
history of any partner." DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 57 (1990).
199. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & PETER R. ORSZAG, AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE
1990s 328 (2002); NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 70, at 131 (2005).
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among backbone providers. 20 0 Through mutually beneficial peering
arrangements, backbone providers have generally shied from seeking
governmental dispute resolution. This environment differs from the highly
contentious telecommunications environment, where disputes over
interconnection between incumbent and newcomer wireline rivals 20 1 or
hands-off charges among wireless providers20 2 have occupied federal and
state regulators for years.
There is a movement afoot to create a self-regulatory organization
(SRO) capable of addressing disputes over
network management issues,
203
including at least one member of the FCC.
Network management, like network neutrality, comprises a broad
swath of concepts. The Comcast dispute addressed that company's policies
addressing treatment of P2P traffic during periods of assumed network
congestion. One definition includes the "activities, methods, procedures,
and tools that pertain to the operation, administration, maintenance, and
provisioning of networked systems ' ,2°4 - a sweeping set of activities that
includes prioritizing packets to where a network gets built. While all parties
agree that reasonable network management is essential, what constitutes
"reasonable" network management is an exercise in line drawing that is at
the heart of the Comcast dispute.
The first, and perhaps insurmountable, challenge for the SRO will be
to achieve agreement on what its charter is. In the SRO, non-ISP
interests-academics, public interest groups, and content or application
providers like Google or BitTorrent-would consider and comment upon
the network management practices of the ISP. The ISP would try to address
200. See General Accounting Office, Characteristics and Competitiveness of the Internet
Backbone Market, Report 02-16, at 7-23 (2001).
201. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (2009) (creating the obligation on telecommunications
service providers to interconnect).
202. Roaming charges have been a long-running dispute among local and national
wireless carriers: "No customer should have to see the words 'No Service' on their wireless
device when there is a compatible network available." Reexamination of Roaming
Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Report And OrderAnd Further
Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 15817, 15886 (2007) (Comm'r Jonathan
Adelstein, approving in part, concurring in part).
203. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028, at 13088 (2008) (Comm'r Robert M. McDowell, Dissenting). See Robert
M. McDowell, Who Should Solve this Internet Crisis?, WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at Al 7,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2008/07/27/
AR2008072701172.html. Philip Weiser has begun discussions on how to devise a new SRO
to address network-management issues of the type raised in the Comcast case. PHILIP J.
WEISER, EXPLORING SELF REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, (2008),

available
at
http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/documents/publications/summits/
WeiserNetworkManagement.pdf.
204.

ALEXANDER CLEMM, NETWORK MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS

5 (2006).
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objections in that forum rather than deal with a complaint process filed at
the FCC.
No enterprise will agree to submit every business practice to a
working group whose membership may include commercial or ideological
interests adverse to its own. In this sense, the SRO really is an adviceleading-to-consent organization.
The issues raised in the Comcast case would seem well suited for an
across-the-table discussion with the relevant parties. In fact, perhaps in an
effort to ward off a finding of wrongdoing, Comcast took this initiative on
its own while its complaint was pending before the agency and it developed
working relationships with BitTorrent and others.2 °5 And the FCC's
ordered remedy in the case-submissions within thirty days of a revised set
of congestion management rules-might have been best developed in
discussions with representatives of public-interest groups and application
providers, who raised the first sets of complaints.20 6
But, even where there is consensus that the SRO legitimately should
address an issue, what mechanism is there to ensure that the parties will
work to a consensus in a reasonable time period? Advocates of SRO
resolution recommend that there be government regulation as a backstop in
the event the parties cannot reach common ground. 0 7 But, given the history
of the FCC in network management prior to issues relating to broadband

205. On March 27, 2008, Comcast and BitTorrent announced they would "undertake a
collaborative effort with one another and with the broader Internet and ISP community to
more effectively address issues associated with rich media content and network capacity
management." Press Release, Comcast, Comcast & Bit Torrent Form Collaboration to
Address Network Mgmt., Network Architecture and Content Distribution (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=740.
A
month later, Comcast and Pando, another P2P provider, announced an industry-wide effort
to "create a 'P2P Bill of Rights and Responsibilities' (BRR) for peer-to-peer (P2P) users and
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)." Press Release, Comcast, Comcast & Pando Networks to
Lead Creation of "P2P Bill of Rights and Responsibilities" for Peer-to-Peer Users &
Internet Service Providers (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/
PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=747.
206. These complainants included nonprofit groups, like Free Press and Public
Knowledge, and commercial Web site operators like Vuze. For a discussion of Free Press's
involvement, see Net Neutrality at the FCC, FREE PREss, http://www.freepress.net/
node/43776 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
207. FTC STAFF REPORT, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 136 (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. See Jodi L. Short & Michael W.
Toffel, The Causes and Consequences of Industry Self-Policing 15 (Harvard Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 08-021, 2007) ("[O]ur findings support a regulatory policy that
recognizes the ongoing importance of government regulation and regulators to the success
of public-private regulatory partnerships."). And where government regulation is
withdrawn, as it was when the FCC stopped considering the news bias complaints of the
National News Council, self-regulation atrophied. Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and
the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 758 (1999).
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network providers,2 °8 this "safety valve" is a backstop with little to
recommend it. The likelihood that the FCC would decide any unresolved
SRO dispute might act as an inducement to reach timely settlement with
those challenging the ISP's behavior. But, if the bid-ask gap is too great,
the SRO mechanism is liable to fail or be accused of being ineffective by
those seeking changed behavior by the ISP. Since the "legitimacy and
effectiveness of an SRO go hand-in-hand,, 20 9 such an organization may be
hobbled by a delay (by the ISP) in reaching a consensus or its use (by ISP
critics) as a staging area for "gotchas" to be used once the dispute moves to
the federal agency.
Also, no matter how lauded the SRO is, the FCC is unlikely to shed
its residual authority unless barred from acting by Congress. Given the
need for quick action on issues like direct blocking behavior (as
condemned in the Madison River case210), complete FCC withdrawal is not
really a possibility.
The failure of the SRO to resolve an issue through consensus should
not automatically confer authority on the FCC to decide the issue. There is
a sea of difference between telling a dominant ISP to stop blocking a
competing application (as in Madison River) and intervening in every
dispute where a critic believes the ISP's pipe is not dumb enough to its
liking. Ideally, the SRO could address much of what falls below the
Madison River paradigm case.
The SRO could take on less contentious tasks, such as deciding
network-management policies, however, particularly where there is
substantial buy-in by all parties to the authority of the group. The SRO
could offer advisory opinions as opposed to decisions. An ISP inclined to
launch a new practice might seek the views of the group as to its strengths
and weaknesses, much as it might submit proposed new services to
consumer panels for feedback and improvement. The SRO might be
required to provide a statement of advantages and disadvantages to a
practice, lest the ISP's justification for it becomes lost in statements of only
a critical or disparaging character.
There are a host of factors that will determine how successful the
SRO might be here, besides determining its jurisdiction. If ISPs see it in
their enlightened self-interest to refer matters to the organization instead of
the FCC, that concession will help its credibility. If ISP critics believe the
forum is a fair one for resolving complaints, that too will help confidence
in the SRO process. Feedback on the Internet about its work, as well as

208. See supra Sec.IIl(C).
209. WEISER, supra note 177, at 27.
210. Madison River Comm., LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
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who finances it, will also affect its credibility. And, if it produces results
that are credible to all sides, it will be helped as well.
Successful examples of self-regulation exist. As SRO, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (originally established as the National
Association of Securities Dealers), although governed by agency rules, is
used to manage securities markets (even though it failed to address the
broader market problems brought on by over leverage and has proved itself
no replacement for formal regulation). 211 A less-tarnished example might
be the National Advertising Division, an SRO of the advertising industry,
which adjudicates claims about advertising, thereby avoiding the FTC's
more formal processes under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Act.
So, the history of cooperative SROs and advisory groups suggests that
one could work to address network-management issues. But it may not stop
complainants going to the FCC and drawing the agency into asserting its
authority to govern networks for which it has shown less than prodigious
aptitude.
This Article turns to two other possibilities for dispute resolution: (1)
reliance on community values and pressure and (2) contract law, tied to
disclosure requirements.
D.

Wiki Law: Community Policing as Policy

The wiki phenomenon belongs near the top of those online
communications that "coalesce into dynamic human relationships made
possible by a globally addressable network., 212 The Internet culture is full
of feedback and referral mechanisms. For physical reasons, it is often
described as a network of networks, but the catch phrase also captures its
content cycle. Networks cycle to data-collection points, whether actively
pursued (as in blogs, social networks, Tweets, creative commons or
wikis), 2 13 affirmatively or passively assented to (as in cookie capture and
"you might also like" offers or anticipated targeted advertising), and
unknown or unwanted (opted-out targeted advertising or zombies,
pretexting, and other ills).
It is the intentional feedback mechanisms of the Internet, perhaps best
portrayed by wikis and blogs, which represent a useful nongovernmental
approach to solving Internet management disputes. Blogs played an
important part in the process leading up to the Comcast complaint and its
aftermath. Bloggers opined on the strength and weaknesses of both the
211. 52 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780 (2000)).
212. Crawford, supranote 7, at 359, 361-62.
213. Id. at 362 ("These relationships, pulled together by interests and accident and
characterized by shifting boundaries and unpredictable dynamics, are what is so attractive
about the Internet.").
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complainants and Comcast. 214 Experiments were run to corroborate the
complaints. 215 Comcast paid attention to these comments and weighed their
relevance and usefulness; it did not merely use the comments to develop
the next set of rebuttal talking points. Over time, some middle-ground
understanding of the problem emerged by some online commentary.2 16 An
online uproar also led to Verizon's within-days reversal of its decision not
to sell short message-code service to an abortion-rights advocacy group.
Thinking more broadly, stories break constantly on the Web; but just
as falsehoods can be part of "cybercascades" (as Cass Sunstein refers to
them),217 so can the truth. And blogs that are watched by policymakers in
industry, the public-interest sector, academia, and government can create a
momentum of their own.218 Discussion would occur on blogs. Eventual
rules could be arrived at on a "network management wiki," updated as
management tools were refined.
There is no reason to think that many management issues cannot
substantially benefit from the public give-and-take of the Internet. These
informal blogs have several advantages over an SRO. Their immediacy and
open-endedness avoid the issue of who gets invited to participate and how
funding affects process. Posted comments also eliminate the delays
between SRO sessions and complained-of management practices. Practices
that emerge from online debate and dialog can be posted to a wiki with the
refinements made as circumstances warrant.
This benefit of sharing and building processes together is hardly new.
Open-source software is predicated on a shared environment where
improvements are cumulative. 21 9 It is a shared-value system that seems to
214. See, e.g., David Kravets, Comcast Beginning 'Net Neutrality Testing, WIRED, June
03, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/comcast-beginni.html;
Posting of
Vindu Goel to BLOG NYTIMES.COM, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/1 i/an-imminentvictory-for-net-neutrality-advocates/ (July 11, 2008, 12:53 EST).
215. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028, para. 7, 9 (2008).
216. See, e.g., George Ou, Fixing the Unfairness of TCP Congestion Control,
ZDNet.com, Mar. 24, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?cat=-30 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
217. CASS SuNsTEIN, REPUBL1C.COM 2.0 46 (2007).
218. The FCC established its own broadband policy blog in 2009. See Blogband:
Broadband.gov blog, http://blog.broadband.gov/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
219. Jonathan Zittrain makes an apt comparison of wiki-like regulation to a physicalworld example of a Dutch community that eliminates government-posted traffic signs that
leads to less accidents:
They are verkeersbordvrij, a light regulatory touch coupled with an openness to
flexible public involvement, including a way for members of the public to make
changes, good or bad, with immediate effect; a focus on earnest discussion,
including reference to neutral dispute resolution policies, as a means of being
strengthened rather than driven by disagreements; and a core of people prepared to
model an ethos that others can follow.
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work, although the model has not been thought of in terms of achieving
standards for network management. But it is not as foreign a concept as it
might seem. The cable industry (as surprising as it may be to its critics) has
promoted standards that can only be described as open source in some
aspects of its business. This open approach includes the following: the
DOCSIS standard for cable modems (allowing scores of manufacturers to
create attaching equipment to the cable network), 220 and the specifications
for unaffiliated two-way applications to run on its interactive "Tru2way"
video platform, even if they are subject to some operator oversight. 221 The
growing number of applications for 3G phones is another example from the
wireless industry.
And such a process might open up prospects for business models that
now seem difficult to implement. As discussed earlier, much of the network
neutrality debate has been about whether a broadband network can provide
priority transmission to certain applications. While some content providers
222
time
at one time would welcome this service, its controversy has made it a
nonstarter. Any broadband network that risks this offering may find itself
embroiled in an FCC inquiry. An open online dialog might lead to a better
understanding of the reasons for and against trying this service. And there
may be other business models that could be "brown bagged" through an
online forum.
Wiki law has the additional advantage (or drawback) over the FCC or
an SRO of being a never-ending course of action. Political winds can shift

ZrrrRAIN, supra note 125, at 146.
220. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Fifth
Report, 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, para. 8, 9 (2008) [hereinafter Fifth Report].
221. Tru2way technology can be used to create and deploy new applications and features
that appear on the television screen with a click of the television remote. Viewers can access
interactive entertainment, information, or features embedded in a particular program
including interactive games, shopping, music, news, weather, local information, sports,
interactive advertising, voting and polling, banking, and other services. Previously called
"OpenCable" or OCAP, several manufacturers, including Sony, LG, and Funai, agreed to
produce digital television sets with this technology, which eliminates the need for a set top
box from the operator. Media Release, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, LG Electronics
available at
(July 28, 2008),
Tru2way MOU
Electric Sign
and Funai
http://www.ncta.com/ReleaseType/ MediaRelease/LG-and-Funai-Sign-tru2way-MOU.aspx.
222. The following quotation is relevant here:
HDnet owner Mark Cuban thinks that "we need multiple tiers of service [on the
Internet].... I want the telcos and the cable companies .... to work out a way to
exchange traffic at multiple quality of service levels." What he really wants is the
right to buy off Internet providers to ensure that HDnet's video web content works
faster and better than video on other sites. (Originally appearing on Blog
Maverick, January 15, 2006).
Common Cause, Quotes on Network Neutrality, http://www.commoncause.org/site/
pp.asp?c=dkLNKlMQIwG&b=1388061 (on file with author, view has been deleted from
Mark Cuban's blog).
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at the FCC; an SRO may be stymied by its processes; an antitrust suit may
never seem to end. But, night after night, observers of questionable
network practices can alert policymakers, the news media, other bloggers
and the networks themselves about shortcomings. And an effective online
forum, while it cannot order a network to cease and desist, can focus
continuing shame on the broadband provider.
That shame can be backed up by customers threatening FCC
intervention (however bad an idea that is) as a spur to reform the
conduct. 223 The threat of an expensive and uncertain regulatory proceeding
is not idle. And online or physical-world protests attacking the reputation
of the broadband provider also matter. Verizon's short-lived, SMS code
rejection has had staying power in the network neutrality debate, no matter
how often and how vociferously Verizon repudiated the company's initial
decision. If the online community, including the broadband providers, takes
on the character of open-source and wiki environments,224 there is reason to
accord this form of dispute resolution more than a pat on the head.
And it is congenial with the consensus-driven, cooperative history of
Internet governance. As Jonathan Zittrain argues, the future of the Internet
225
is aligned with generative models of the sort typified by blogs and wikis.
The absence of regulation in areas as law-prone as automobile traffic signs
has proved to produce more automobile safety, as illustrated by one of
Zittrain's more memorable examples.226 Regulators can be viewed as
preserving the generative quality of the Internet by forbidding operators
from blocking innovation inconsistent with the network owner's selfinterest; that, after all, is the basis for activists seeking more regulation
from the FCC. But, beyond blocking, it is unclear that regulators will
invariably do more good than harm in restricting network practices without
a thorough examination of all of the generative/nongenerative aspects of
the practices. A wiki-based system of rules might accomplish that better.

223. The Verizon SMS complaint was a quick response to Internet attention. See supra
note 2.
224. See SuNstmN, supra note 217 (discussing Wikipedia: "The great benefit of
deliberating enclaves is that positions may emerge that otherwise would not, and that
deserve to play a larger role both within the enclave and within the heterogeneous public.").
225. ZrrnTRAJN, supra note 125 at 127-48.
226. Id. at 128-29 ("When people can come to take the welfare of one another seriously
and possess the tools to readily assist and limit each other, even the most precise and wellenforced rule from a traditional public source may be less effective than that uncompelled
goodwill.").
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ContractLaw andDisclosure
Dean Leon Green once described tort law as public law in disguise.227

It might be said that, in a consumer economy, contracts can inhabit the
same disguise. For instance, the twentieth century's favorite tort, invasion
of privacy, has become a question of rights alienable through opt-in
agreements with users of information like Google or online broadband
providers.228
Much of the complainants' consternation, occasionally descending
into name calling, 229 in the network management debate arises from the

lack of disclosure in the ISP's acceptable-use policy given to its
subscribers. 230 For most customers, these disclosures would be hard to
understand or be of no consequence. 23' For example, over ninety-nine

227. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEx. L. REv. 257 (1960).
228. See Gateway Learning Corp., Agreement ContainingConsent Order,File No. 0423047, availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423047/040707agree0423047.pdf (stating
that educational company agreed it violated its contract when it shared personal information
after it agreed not to do so); Press Release, FTC, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy
Charges (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm ("'It's
simple-if you collect information and promise not to share, you can't share unless the
consumer agrees,' said Howard Beales, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer
Protection.").
229. See, e.g., Posting of Harold Feld to Wetmachine, http://www.wetmachine.
com/?query=jim+harper&amount=0&blogid=l (Nov. 1, 2007, 19:35 EST) ("Because while
some folks may think that lying to your customers is an acceptable network management
technique, or even an acceptable technique for managing elected members of Congress, I
think most Americans would disagree."); Posting of Harold Feld to Wetmachine,
http://www.wetmachine.com/item/1156 (April 24, 2008 22:00:08 EST) ("He [Internet user]
was going about his normal business when he discovered something, investigated, and
Comcast lied their asses off about it.") (author commenting on original posting).
230. Comcast did not disclose what its network practices were to deal with congestion.
In particular, it did not disclose or explain its use of application-specific (i.e., targeting
BitTorrent users) rather than application-agnostic tools to manage traffic. It did not explain
when those tools would be triggered. It did not inform the user what amount of use might
trigger throttling back speeds because of the effect of that use on others. It did not disclose
at what level in the network-an individual residence, a node of 500 homes, a port
comprising many nodes--congestion would be measured. These shortcomings were
remedied in its subsequent filing. Compare Comments of Free Press Ex Parte Filing at 2-3,
WC Docket No. 07-52, (rel. Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Free Press Ex Parte Filing],
available
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native orpdf=pdf&id_
document=6520179100, and Formal Complaint of Free Press, supra note 3 with Comments
of Comcast Corp. at 39-42, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, (rel. Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://tiallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor-pdf=pdf&id-document=651984099
1.
231. The same has been said of opt-in disclosure through shrinkwrap agreements.
Compare ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding such contracts
enforceable because customer had opportunity to review terms before accepting), with
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that
shrinkwrap agreements binding after five days of receipt by customer do not show that
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percent of users never get anywhere near an announced bit-rate cap.232 And
even P2P users are often unaware of slow downs because the file transfers
occur while the customer's computer is unattended. So their significance
for many subscribers is dubious, just as annual financial privacy disclosure
forms or cardholder agreements from credit-card companies are seldom
read by customers.
But, as the Comcast complaint and its aftermath 233 demonstrate, these
terms are of enormous importance to some customers and, more generally,
to Internet academics and activists. 234 The details of these terms can be
used to determine whether promises are delivered and whether Internet
values of, for instance, transparency and non-blocking of content are
followed. And they are entirely within the control of the broadband
provider, assuming that the ISP is aware that there is a need to formalize
the disclosure.
This latter point is not as obvious as disclosure advocates may think.
Decision making as to network operations may be disbursed throughout an
organization.23 5 Policyrnakers and executives who do not manage the
customer expressly agreed to terms). These decisions turn on the degree to which the
customer provided constructive versus actual consent.
232. See Comcast, Terms of Service-Announcement Regarding an Amendment to Our
Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009) (establishing a specific monthly data usage threshold of 250 GB/month per
account for all residential customers); Comcast, Customer Central, Frequently Asked
Questions about Excessive Use, http://help.comcast.net/content/faq/Frequently-AskedQuestions-about-Excessive-Use#excessive (last visited Dec. 10, 2009) (less than one
percent of customers are excessive users).
233. Free Press, which brought one of the initial complaints against Comcast, was
satisfied with the company's subsequent FCC-ordered disclosure and wanted all ISPs to
provide comparable disclosure. See Free Press Ex Parte Filing, supra note 230, at 5-6
("Comcast has demonstrated that providers can disclose clear, basic, yet valuable
information on infrastructure and on methods and thresholds for network controls.").
234. The Florida Attorney General investigated and settled with Comcast over its
bandwidth usage disclosures prior to its bandwidth cap modification to its acceptable user
policy. Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen. of Fla., Bill McCollum, Att'y Gen. Reaches
$150,000
Settlement
with
Comcast
(Aug.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/D703 11 C8F6COFC02852574B4005661
34. Some activists do not believe disclosure is sufficient in all cases. See Press Release, Pub.
Knowledge, Pub. Knowledge Praises FCC Decision to Protect Internet, Punish Comcast
(July 31, 2008), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1690 (commenting on
Comcast Complaint Decision: "Simple disclosure policies or consumer education is simply
not sufficient.").
235. Compare, for example, Federal Express's protocol in delivering packages through
its network. There is considerable visibility as to a shipment's movement via the company's
Web site. But we know little about which locations are more likely than not to be delayed
for pickup, what rules apply when certain airports are closed, and what priorities apply when
the network is overbooked. Myriad other businesses, from supermarket chains to broadcast
networks, have decentralized decision making that leads to results that top management
cannot control. Whoever was behind the celebrated "wardrobe malfunction" during CBS's
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network may be either unaware of these decisions, how they are made, or
their importance to Internet watchers.2 36 What turns out to be a significant
disclosure matter sometimes arises only when a significant problem arises.
The selling practices of electricity network wholesalers were, and today
are, a matter of obscure interest.
During the 2000 California power
237
shortage, it was front-page news.

Reliance on disclosure has a distinct advantage over regulation: it is
faster than an agency adjudication.238 It allows for a question to be asked
immediately and answered quickly on the Internet when a dispute arises
and can take advantage of the wiki-law debate surrounding it. It requires
the network ISP to think through its practices, knowing that an ambiguous
response will invite further questions. It also has the benefit of contract
where the customer believes the network has not lived up to its
representations.239
Barbara van Schewick argues that disclosure is not sufficient unless a
customer can easily change to another provider whose terms of service are
more acceptable. 240 As discussed earlier,2 4' ISPs may choose not to
2004 Super Bowl coverage, it was probably not the company lawyers and executives who
then had to defend it.
236. Until the network-management practices in Comcast were formally questioned,
there was very little drill down by management as to what any particular ISP did to handle
peak upstream congestion. The system was serving the vast majority of customers without a
hitch. The problem (as Comcast saw it) dealt with P2P traffic which, more often than not, is
focused on illegal copying, and the techniques used benefited the large number of customers
who had nothing to do with P2P. While Comcast did not agree with the FCC's authority to
act, its response expressed a willingness to address the problems raised by its critics. See
Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corporation,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (Sept. 19, 2009)
(available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeorjpdf=pdf&id
document=6520169715) ("Moreover, we know that clear communication with our
customers is essential to a successful long-term relationship. So we are committed to
ensuring that our customers receive clear, concise, and useful information about the services
that we provide.").
237. See David Shook, The Power Meltdown in California, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 2000,
availableat http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2000/nf2000126_813.htm.
238. See Aaron J. Burstein & Fred B. Schneider, Trustworthiness as a Limitation on
Network Neutrality, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 591, 619 (2009); Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive
Policymaking:Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutionsfor U.S. CommunicationsPolicy,
61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 587 (2009).
239. A contract approach has been suggested in lieu of a tort approach to protect
information privacy, based on enforcement of a web site's privacy policies. ZITrRAiN, supra
note 125, at 226.
240. FCC's Second Public En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management
Practices at 4, WC Docket No. 07-52, (2008) (Official Testimony of Barbara van Shewick),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork_management/041708/vanschewickwritten.pdf. As van Shewick testified:
Disclosure can only facilitate competition and discipline providers if there is
effective competition. In order for disclosure to have a disciplining effect,
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compete on non-price criteria like network-management disclosure. So the
ability to change may not really matter, and van Schewick's test standard
would never be met. This Article argues that the more sensible way to
judge disclosure statements is on the basis of their accuracy and
responsiveness to the objections raised on the wiki. In addition, the terms
should be enforceable.
Part of the issue is deciding what matters to the different
constituencies of disclosure: customers, policy advocates, networks, and
applications providers. As network providers gain an understanding of
what parties expect to know, they can formulate their customer disclosure
statements to be more responsive to actual concerns.242 This is an evolving
process.243 Identifying what is important to disclose and then accurately
disclosing it-in the Comcast case, what does its nodal infrastructure look
like and the procedures the ISP follows in case of network congestion-can
resolve many network-management issues. For once, the company's policy
is established and modified through the wiki-law process of online
dickering; 244 it is disclosed in the acceptable use policy or on the network
provider's Web site. Just as the customer agrees to abide by the terms of
that policy, so too is the ISP bound to follow its commitments. And a
failure to comply amounts to a contract breach.
The evolving disclosure process can apply to non-network
management issues too, such as offering QoS as an optional product to
content providers. The degree of disclosure will also reveal the sufficiency
of the competitive justifications for a given practice. And it will allow

customers need to be able to switch to another provider that does not impose a
similar restriction, and they need to be able to do so at low costs.
Id.
241. See supra § II(B).
242. Disclosure is by no means only a network provider issue. For example, persons
responding to Google e-mail may find that their e-mail is searchable just as Google e-mail
accounts are. And search-term logs kept by search engines may pose privacy problems as
well. Identifying information can also be obtained from a Web site. See, e.g., Google,
Search Term Demonstration, http://www.google-watch.org/cgi-bin/urldemo.htm (last visited
Dec. 10, 2009) (demonstrating how a Web site can identify your place of business if a
search is made from there).
243. Free Press proposed a sixteen-part disclosure requirement that the FCC would adopt
covering network management (or "interference" as Free Press described it), monitoring of
a customer's data, and infrastructure, such as the number of users located on a shared
connection. Free Press Ex Parte Filing, supranote 230, at 11-13.
244. This online dialog began after Comcast announced the use of bit caps to deal with
bandwidth hogs. Free Press challenged that approach. Free Press Policy Brief, S. Derek
Turner, Research Director, Free Press, Blocking or Metering: A False Choice, (Aug. 2008),
availableat http://live.freepress.net/files/BlockingorMeteringA_FalseChoice.pdf.
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applications providers to adjust their behavior in light of the network
operator's disclosures.24 5
Exposure to contract breaches can be costly to entities like broadband
providers. Cable operators are targets of class-action lawsuits challenging
246
the terms of service, for example, fees for late payment of cable bills.
The ISP will have furnished the disclosure language, and a dissatisfied
customer can pinpoint its objections. State consumer protection laws may
also apply to disclosures that are not backed up by behavior. That leverage,
and the threat of larger liability, along with the ISP's decision to include
the term in its own contract at the beginning, gives considerable weight to
this method of establishing network norms enforceable outside of a federal
regulatory regime.
Of course, there may be terms that a customer does not like, and those
terms may be incorporated by all significant ISPs serving a customer. For
instance, suppose both of the two largest broadband providers today, cable
and the telco, disclose that they provide QoS, as opposed to best efforts, to
those who will pay. Disclosure may require detailing how the priority
service does (or does not) disadvantage the best-efforts service all other
traffic will receive. But disclosure is obviously not the same as prohibiting
or limiting the practice. If the explanation is satisfactory, it will pass the
Internet's laugh test; if not, it will continue to be assailed by critics and
may be a violation of the ISP's contract with the customer, if QoS for some
actually impairs service to others. If disputed, disclosed terms are so onesided or hard-headed, the inability to defend them on the Internet will spill
over to other arenas of concern to large network operators, including its
other lines of business or as a near-last resort, the regulator (the short lifecycle of the Verizon SMS incident is illustrative). 247 And the detailed
245. In the Comcast case, one of the complaints came from Vuze, an online video
distributor which uses BitTorrent to download its offerings. Vuze, Inc. Pet. to Establish
Rules Governing Network Mgnt. Practices by Broadband Network Operators, Petitionfor
Rulemaking, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, p. 7 n.8 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/vuze-petition-20071114.pdf.
Had it known of
Comcast's singling-out of BitTorrent, it could have adjusted its distribution practices, just as
businesses adjust practices to deadlines established by Federal Express or the U.S. Postal
Service.
246. See, e.g., Cantu v. AT&T Broadband, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1185 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 2006); Garcia v. Texas Cable Partners, LP, 114 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App. Corpus
Christi 2003). More cases are cited in BRENNER, supranote 29, at § 7:54 n.2.
247. Verizon's decision not to sell an abortion-rights group access to its short messaging
service, a business choice which even its critics say was entirely legal, lasted only a few
days, after the story got out (and before any regulatory proceeding commenced). See supra
note 2. And Comcast's changes to its disclosure about its management techniques while the
complaint against it was pending shows how demanding disclosure can act to ameliorate
disputed management practices, even though the shadow of regulatory action was present.
See supra note 203.
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explanation may advance an antitrust claim against a truly anticompetitive
practice related to QoS.

VII. CONCLUSION
Each day that we use the Internet to discover something valuable, we
believe more deeply that fast Internet access is indispensable for engaged
living. Google's tenth anniversary was a moment to pause to consider how
just one company has changed what we know and how we learn. 248
Modeling this vibrant space takes us in many directions. It may start with
the code-as-law analysis and advocates of the Internet as layers. It engages
in a near-religious war between network neutrality advocates who envision
a dumb (or nearly dumb) pipe provided by broadband providers and those
who champion generative benefits from whatever source-network
innovations alongside edge improvements.
So far, missing in this analysis is a careful view of where advocates of
active federal regulation would take their case. This Article has focused on
that regulator-the FCC. It appears limited in its ability to function as the
creator or wise arbiter of ex ante rules, measured by what it is, its
resources, and its record of success and failure in guiding and governing
communications networks. Its greatest regulatory successes in spurring
networks have paradoxically occurred through inaction. Its biggest
failures-video dialtone, for instance-arose when it tried to shape
networks based on its judgment rather than the market. Congress had little
better luck with its formulation of OVS.
There are better alternatives to government regulation (and the
inevitable court appeals). These approaches include the young, but vibrant,
development of online debate and resolution through blogs and wikis
enforceable disclosure rights in contract. They are more congenial to the
human values that we seek to unlock by the Internee 49 than a trail of
litigation-bound decisions that agency adjudication will produce. It may be
impossible to avoid an ex ante regulatory approach. But, as this Article
demonstrates, there is a better way forward.

248. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Google still innovating on 10th anniversary, SF Chron.,
Sept. 7, 2008, at Al.
249. Crawford, supranote 7, at 390-91.

